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AUSTRIA’S PRE-WAR                                                  
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Maria L. Marcus∗
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 19, 1930, a Viennese newspaper published an article under the 
title, “His Magnificence The Rector: Scandal at the University of Vienna.”1  
The author analyzed and attacked the government-sponsored University’s 
new regulations dividing the students into four “nations”—German, non-
German (e.g., Jewish), mixed, or “other.”  These regulations had been 
presented by the Rector as vehicles for voluntary association of students 
with common ethnic roots.  The article noted, however, that under the new 
system, individuals were precluded from deciding themselves to which 
nation they belonged.  A student would be designated as non-German even 
if he was a German-speaking Austrian citizen descended from generations 
of citizens, unless he could prove that his parents and his grandparents had 
been baptized.2
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 1. Seine Magnifizenz der Rektor: Der Weiner Universitaets Skandal [His Magnificence 
the Rector: The Vienna University Scandal], WIENER SONN-UND MONTAGS ZEITUNG, May 
19, 1930, at 4 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author).  Ernst 
Klebinder, Editor-in-Chief, identified himself as the author of the article and took 
responsibility for its content.  See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 2. See BRUCE F. PAULEY, FROM PREJUDICE TO PERSECUTION: A HISTORY OF AUSTRIAN 
ANTI-SEMITISM 125 (1992); Protokoll über die öffentliche-mündliche Verhandlung des 
VfGH am 18.6.1931 [Public Hearing in Constitutional Court on June 18, 1931],  AVA-
VfGH, V 2/31-10 at 4 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author) 
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The newspaper’s editor was criminally prosecuted for this publication on 
the grounds that he had failed to exercise “press prudence,” and had 
defamed the Academic Senate and the Rector of the University of Vienna 
by accusing them of promulgating unlawful measures.3  His defense was 
that the article had accurately characterized the university regulations as 
unconstitutional, and that academic officials had no authority to create such 
student groups.  This legal analysis was grounded on the conclusions of an 
eminent authority, Dr. Joseph Hupka, a former Dean of Vienna Law 
School.4  The trial court, presided over by the Justice for Press Affairs, 
admitted all the defendant’s evidence and granted his application to petition 
the Constitutional Court—Austria’s highest tribunal on fundamental 
constitutional matters—for rescission of the regulations in their entirety.5
In the hearing before the Constitutional Court, counsel for the defendant 
editor argued that equality of all citizens before the law prohibited 
differentiating individuals on the basis of ethnic group, language, or 
religion.  In a chillingly prophetic comment, he suggested that if a 
government-operated university could lawfully mandate such student 
separation, then it would be possible for the government to do so in all 
situations, compelling residence in different parts of town and employment 
only by a person of the same religion.
 
6  The response by the Rector was 
that there was no constitutional defect in the University’s regulations 
because the student groups all had identical rights.7  Less than twenty-five 
years later in the United States, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
separate-but-equal claims in Brown v. Board of Education.8
Constitutional generalities such as equal protection, freedom of 
association, and rights of citizenship must be unpacked by focusing on their 
less appealing implications.  Consider whether equal protection is satisfied 
if groups have equal rights but unequal power; whether freedom of 
association necessarily and invariably encompasses the freedom to exclude; 
 
 
[hereinafter Hearing]. 
 3. Sammlung der Erkenntnisse und Wichtigsten Beschlüsse des 
Verfassungsgerichtshofes [Decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court], VfSlg 1397/1931, 
AVA-VfGH, V 2/31-12 at 298 (June 20, 1931) (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) 
(translation on file with author) [hereinafter Decision].  The decision was announced on 
June 23, 1931. 
 4. Aus dem Gerichtssalle [From the Courtroom], NEUE FREIE PRESSE, (Vienna), June 
20, 1930, at 3.  (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author).  See 
infra note 249 for a description of Dr. Hupka’s prior stance in the public press. 
 5. Decision, supra note 3, at 298. 
 6. Hearing, supra note 2, at 7. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (disavowing the prior decision in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)). 
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and whether the prerogatives of generations of citizenship are inadequate to 
trump competing claims. 
This Article analyzes these questions in two contexts: the little-known 
legal developments in pre-Hitler Austria that staved off the attempt to 
segregate University students, and the still-controversial formulation in 
Brown that sought to end racial segregation of students in America.  The 
United States Supreme Court in the 1950’s, like the Austrian Constitutional 
Court, was asked to interpret a constitutional equality principle that 
embodied the ideals of a democracy but was in conflict with a violent and 
historically-entrenched reality. 
Part I will discuss the actual deliberations of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court Justices in this case and explore the shaping of their decision, a 
decision reflecting an uneasy synthesis of opposing views.  The Justices 
rejected the Rector’s jurisdictional objections, and instead undertook the 
responsibility of striking down the Student Orders on the basis of statutory 
violations.  Yet the opinion also contained language that might guide the 
Academic Senate in future grouping of students by “nationality” if such 
division conformed to constitutional principles. 
The Constitutional Court was denounced in the pan-German press as “an 
enemy of the German people in terms of blood and political policy,”9 and 
members of the German Student Body protested the decision by engaging 
in a campaign of brutal assaults against other students.10  The Rector 
protected these assailants from arrest by the police.11
Part II of the Article will consider the relevance of the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling to Brown and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
  The next few years 
produced not only a dramatic attempt to achieve segregation of University 
students through federal legislation, but also a new Constitution that 
substantially diminished the Court’s powers and the rights of Austrian 
citizens to receive equal treatment.  Nonetheless, the judiciary’s rejection 
of Austria’s first effort to separate citizens on the basis of religion and 
ethnicity was effective until the Anschluss of Germany and Austria seven 
years later. 
12
 
 9. Der Verfassungsgerichtshof bricht deutsches Recht! [The Constitutional Court 
Breaks German Law!], DEUTSCHOESTERREICHISCHE TAGES-ZEITUNG (Vienna), June 24, 
1931, at 1 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author). 
 cases 
and underlying facts with curious parallels to the Austrian situation.  The 
 10. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 126. 
 11. See id. 
 12. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that assignment of an African-America student to 
separate facilities within the University of Oklahoma constituted a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
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segregationist regimes in both countries invoked similar mystiques and 
developed similar prohibitions.  There were also substantial differences: in 
Austria, the universities were receding from uneasy integration to (literal) 
dis-integration.  In America, the trajectory was reversed. 
Part III, however, suggests that Brown’s prohibition against segregation 
in public universities has left unanswered questions about the conflict 
between First and Fourteenth Amendment purposes.  Associational 
freedoms may be pitted against anti-discrimination policies and the 
compelling academic interest in a diverse student body recognized in the 
Supreme Court’s Grutter v. Bollinger opinion.13
I. 
  Exploring concepts of 
association, equality, and diversity in the violent Austrian society of the 
1930’s can illuminate the present-day constitutional conflicts facing 
America’s universities and courts. 
In my discussion of mandatory invidious separation of university 
students in Austria and in America, I interpret the term “racism” as 
implicating more than one group’s consuming dislike of another.  Under 
Professor George Fredrickson’s brief and useful definition, “racism exists 
when one ethnic group or historical collectivity dominates, excludes, or 
seeks to eliminate another on the basis of differences that it believes are 
hereditary and unalterable.”14
*  *  *  * 
 
The University of Vienna’s regulations—the Nazi Student Orders, as 
they came to be called—were the culmination of decades of strife that had 
complex political, religious, and economic elements.  The Austrian 
Habsburg monarchy’s multi-national empire had collapsed by the end of 
1918, and post-war Austria was merely the bodyless head that remained 
after the break-up.15
 
 13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
  University students had bleak employment prospects 
in the diminished territory of the Austrian republic, with its enormous 
surplus of civil servants and soldiers.  The rather high percentage of Jewish 
students, some from the former Austro-Hungarian eastern provinces, 
produced competition for jobs that helped to fuel an academic anti-
 14. GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 170 (2002).  In the Nazi 
framework of belief, Jews were a “race” rather than adherents of a religion, tainted by 
nature and “blood.”  See infra Parts I.H.2 and II.A.1. 
 15. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 78-79. 
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Semitism exceeding that of Germany.16  Professor Bruce F. Pauley has 
observed that this anti-Semitism was permitted by sympathetic university 
administrators and sheltered by a concept of academic autonomy, 
originating in the Middle Ages, which permitted universities to police (or 
decline to police) themselves.17
As will be shown below, Nazi power both inside and outside the 
universities increased in the 1930’s, though not without conflict.  Student 
groups fought for political dominance; the Justices of the Constitutional 
Court struggled for unanimity in disposing of the Nazi Student Orders; top 
federal officials launched a fresh legislative segregation package; and a 
new Constitution established an authoritarian corporate state that was later 
absorbed into a Third Reich in which one could be “German” but no longer 
Austrian and certainly not Jewish. 
 
 
A. The Political Setting of the Constitutional Court’s Decision: 
Student Polarization and Nazi Violence 
The Socialist administration of “Red Vienna” gave little thought to the 
economic insecurity of University students, perhaps convinced that most of 
them were anti-Semites and anti-communists.18  Flowing into this vacuum, 
the German Student Body set up a foreign monetary exchange and 
provided cheaper meals for poor students.19  Its members extolled manhood 
and honor in the field of battle, a battle against the myriad enemies they 
believed were encircling them.  Recurring attacks against democrats, 
Socialists, pacifists, and especially Jews, were carried out by the German 
Student Body without interference by University officials during the 1920’s 
and early 1930’s.20
To cite only a few examples, Nazi students from the Technical College 
invaded the lecture hall of a famous scholar at the Anatomy Institute in 
1923, ordering that all Jews vacate the room.
 
21
 
 16. Id. at 89. 
  The following day, Nazis 
stormed into the classroom of a professor at the College of International 
Trade and demanded, in the name of the German Student Body, the 
removal of all Jewish students.  Those who did not leave within three 
minutes were beaten with sticks and rubber clubs, and thrown from the top 
 17. Id. 
 18. John Haag, Blood On The Ringstrasse: Vienna’s Students, 1918-33, in WEINER 
LIBRARY BULLETIN 29, 33 (1976). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 31; see also infra Part I.E.1. 
 21. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 89, 97. 
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of the ramp in front of the main University building.22  Police officers 
posted nearby did not intervene because of “academic freedom”—not the 
students’ freedom to study and do research, but the institution’s protection 
from outside intervention.23  This violence was so extreme that the 
Reichspost, the official daily newspaper of the Christian Social Party, 
called the riot “not only a great wrong, but also a great stupidity” because it 
would provide a strong argument for enemies of Christian German culture 
who wished to undermine the University’s authority to govern itself.24
During 1927 celebrations of the founding of the Republic, Nazi students 
attacked the Socialist Student Association, singing a triumphant party song 
as injured people were carried away.
 
25  In a series of confrontations, they 
also destroyed posters of Jewish organizations, invaded lectures of Jewish 
professors, captured security officials for hours at a time, and disrupted the 
office of the university’s chancellor.26
In the 1930’s large rings of Nazi students, armed with brass knuckles 
and rubber truncheons, would gang up on individuals whose religion or 
opinions were disfavored.
 
27  This brutality was also mirrored outside the 
University, where Austrian Nazis repeatedly attacked Jewish businessmen 
and their families, and at times assaulted pedestrians in the Viennese streets 
who “looked Jewish.”28  Such mass aggressions also occurred with the rise 
of segregation in the American South, where mobs assaulted, robbed and 
murdered African-Americans.29
B.   The Constitutional Court’s Judgment 
 
Under the Austrian system, no ordinary court had the power to “examine 
into the validity of laws duly proclaimed.”30  The Constitutional Court had 
the sole authority to exercise this critical function.31
 
 22. Id. 
  The federal President 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 98. 
 25. Id. at 122. 
 26. Id. at 124. 
 27. Stenographisches Protokoll, 77, Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Oesterreich 
IV. Gesetzgebungsperiode Freitag. 29. April 1932 [Stenographic Minutes, 77th Session of 
the National Council of the Republic of Austria,  Legislative Session, Friday, April 29, 
1932], at 2084-85 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author) 
[hereinafter Parliamentary Debate]; see infra Part I.F.2. 
 28. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 196. The 1930 Nazi electoral victories in Germany 
encouraged such assailants. Id. 
 29. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 30. AUS. CONST. art. 89(1) (1929). 
 31. HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 126 (2d ed. 2000); J.A.C. 
Grant, Judicial Review of Legislation Under the Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 AM. POL. 
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appointed all the Justices from legally designated slates.32  The Court’s 
President, Vice President and six of the Associate Justices were chosen 
from a list prepared by the federal ministry.  Six additional Associate 
Justices were selected from lists prepared by the houses of Parliament.33
These Justices received requests from other courts and administrative 
bodies to resolve constitutional and legal challenges or jurisdictional 
disputes.
 
34
1.   The University’s Orders and Justifications 
  Although the newspaper editor who was prosecuted for his 
criticism of the Nazi Student Orders could not directly bring an action in 
the Constitutional Court, the trial court could hear his claims and then 
petition the High Court for disposition of them. 
After affirming its jurisdiction and announcing its holding that the 
Student Orders were rescinded as contrary to law,35
The University of Vienna’s Rector had proclaimed that students of 
“German ethnic origin” were organized at German universities into groups 
extending beyond national borders.  The Academic Senate therefore 
established the German Student Body at Vienna University as the 
representative of all students of German ethnic origin, and permitted those 
of other ethnic origins and native languages to affiliate with other Student 
Nations “having the same rights and obligations.”
 the Constitutional 
Court sets out the salient facts in a colorless manner that makes no mention 
of the violent context in which the Orders were issued. 
36  Although each Nation 
could elect representatives, the Academic Senate had the authority to 
revoke recognition of anyone who injured interests that “affect the German 
character of the university.”37
A student’s declaration of ethnic origin and native language made in an 
official personal identification document was the basis for assignment to a 
 
 
SCI. REV. 670, 671 (1934). 
 32. HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 139.  For an overview of the development of 
Constitutional Courts in Europe and Central and Latin America, see id. at 137-138. 
One should note in particular that in times of radical political change from a 
totalitarian to a democratic system, the regular judiciary is invariably tainted but 
cannot be replaced quickly, whereas a specialized constitutional court may be 
staffed with competent and reputable jurists.  If sufficiently broad access is 
provided . . . , this court may swiftly impose constitutionality from above. 
Id. at 138. 
 33. Id. at 139; Grant, supra note 31, at 671 n.7. 
 34. See Grant, supra note 31, at 671-72. 
 35. Decision, supra note 3, at 296. 
 36. Id. at 297. 
 37. Id. 
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Nation.38  Such a student’s self-description was not dispositive, however, 
because representatives of a Student Nation could file objections to any 
membership claim.  Objections would be finally determined by an 
arbitration panel comprised of three people appointed from the teaching 
staff by the Academic Senate, one representative of the objecting Nation, 
and possibly one representative of another Nation.39
The opinion then explains how the case reached the High Court.  Ernst 
Klebinder, the editor of a Viennese newspaper, was prosecuted for failing 
to exercise press prudence and insulting the Rector and the Academic 
Senate by accusing them of passing unconstitutional measures.
 
40  At a 
public trial on June 20, 1930 in the District Criminal Court in Vienna, the 
accused “produced evidence of the accuracy of all the points made in the 
article.”41  He urged that the Regulations (the Rector’s term for the Student 
Orders) violated the Constitution, since both Austrian Jewish citizens and 
other citizens among the students were discriminated against in favor of the 
German Student Body.  After receiving these pleadings, the Criminal Court 
proceeded to petition the Constitutional Court for rescission of the 
Regulations on the grounds that 1) the Academic Senate had no authority to 
issue them under relevant statutes and disciplinary provisions and 2) the 
Regulations violated constitutional guarantees of equal rights because they 
divided students on the basis of “the principle of ethnic origin rather than 
the principle of citizenship.”42
 At a subsequent hearing before the Constitutional Court, the 
Academic Senate argued on the procedural front that the Regulations were 
only by-laws of a student-run body having the right of self-
administration.
 
43  As to the equal citizenship claims, the Senate offered the 
justification that the Regulations put all the Nations on the same footing.  
“[A]t most it can be claimed that for many of the Student Nations this 
right . . . has less value than it has for others” but that it would not violate 
the principle of equality.44
2.   Gist of the Court’s Disposition of the Issues 
 
After this summary of the prior proceedings, the Constitutional Court 
addressed the key questions.  Did the Academic Senate have the authority 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 298. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 298-99. 
 43. Id. at 300. 
 44. Id. at 301. 
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to establish segregated student groups?  Would compulsory “ethnic origin” 
divisions among citizens violate the Constitution? 
The first question was definitively answered.  The Constitutional Court 
found that the Student Orders could not be issued by a non-legislative 
institution like the Academic Senate.45  The “Nations” favored by the 
University were in fact associations, and were therefore strictly controlled 
by statute.  The Associations Law of 1867 governed the genesis and 
purposes of all such bodies.46
This potential for full supervision over citizen organizations was a 
particular feature of Austrian law stemming from the reign of Emperor 
Franz Joseph, a feature which will be more closely examined in Part III 
below.
 
47
By contrast, the constitutional issues were not cohesively resolved.  The 
opinion indicated that dividing students by “nationality” could be 
permissible if these groups were given the same rights, and if the 
classification accorded with constitutional principles.
  It enabled the Court to disband the German Student Body, with 
all the Justices affirming that result. 
48
At a later point, the opinion reached the critical question of whether the 
Student Nations were in fact voluntary in nature; the Academic Senate had 
repeatedly declared that the Orders only created a framework for student 
preferences.  The Justices concluded that the regulations apparently 
established compulsory organizations and then curtly stated that it was 
unnecessary to expand on the reasons why such entities could not be 
established by mere Order.  None of the statutes governing associations 
  No finding was 
made as to whether the existing groups did in fact have the same rights, nor 
was there any indication of how “accord” with constitutional principles 
would be demonstrated, or indeed which principles were being referenced. 
 
 45. Id. at 306. 
 46. Id. at 305. 
 47. See also infra Part I.G.2.b, describing the registration procedures under the statute.  
Austria was still a monarchy until a little over a decade before the Constitutional Court’s 
historic decision, and the Associations Law originated as a liberalizing measure under the 
Emperor. 
 48. Decision, supra note 3, at 303-04.  The Court did not explain whether this dictum 
referred solely to the constitutionality of creating voluntary divisions.  The Justices noted, 
however, that “as the Academic Senate emphasizes, the contested Student Regulations are 
aimed at giving students of a given ethnic origin the framework of an Order within which 
they can voluntarily come together.”  Id. at 304-05.  In the same paragraph, the opinion 
identifies the purpose of the Regulations: “Thus the Student Regulations are intended to be 
general regulations, on the basis of which the University students, depending on their origin 
and native language, voluntarily form permanent organized connections for the pursuit of 
specific common goals.”  Id. 
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permitted this arrangement.49  The door was now open for the Court to 
apply the equality principle of the Austrian Constitution and to proclaim 
that although voluntary student groupings would be permissible, 
compulsory divisions would be prohibited.  Instead, the opinion at this 
point remained equivocal.50
Yet the Justices held back from explicit endorsement of mandatory 
divisions, whether generated by academic fiat or statute.  Indeed, this 
failure to legitimate compulsion was duly noted by federal officials who 
crafted a legislative segregation package in the following year, an effort 
that will be discussed below at Part I.E.  In presenting this package to 
Parliament, the Minister of Education insisted that the student divisions 
created were wholly voluntary.
 
51
Also of significance was the Court’s refusal to endorse “ethnic origin” as 
a basis for the student groupings that received conditional approval (if they 
all have the same rights, if they conform to the Constitution, if they accord 
with statutory provisions).  The ethnic origin standard would inter alia 
have forced a student with a Jewish parent (or grandparent) into a Jewish 
group he would not elect.  If he regarded himself as an entirely secular 
Austrian, or conversely as a devout Lutheran, it would make no difference 
to this unwanted group assignment. 
 
Penetration of the Court’s shifting emphases and curious omissions 
requires more extensive analysis.  The judges’ strategy at this perilous 
historic moment can be illuminated by discussion of their actual 
deliberations, which now follows.  Listen to the Justices’ colloquy on each 
of these constitutional issues, as they made concessions, created majorities, 
and then voted.  Their shifting dialogue reflected their awareness that 
future legislative action or constitutional amendment might alter the terrain 
by validating student separation. 
C.  The Justices’ Internal Debate 
The Austrian Constitution of 1929 was an elegant and complete 
statement of the civil and political rights of citizens.  It built on the work of 
 
 49. Id. at 306. 
 50. Id.  After listing statutes governing associations in general, the Court states: 
“Regulations covering the students themselves and dividing them into specific groups could 
be created only by law.”  Id.  This sentence might be interpreted as a mere summary of the 
statutes that have just been cited, which form a barrier against University-created Orders.  
On the other hand, placement of the sentence directly after identification of the Student 
Nations as apparently compulsory might be read as permitting even compulsory associations 
if they were effectuated “by law.”  No existing constitutional obstacles to such a plan are 
discussed. 
 51. See infra Part I.F.2. 
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Dr. Hans Kelsen, and incorporated portions of the 1919 Treaty of Saint-
Germain concerning protection of minorities.52  All Austrian nationals 
were equal before the law, enjoying the same rights without distinction as 
to language, religion, or race.  The Constitution guaranteed that differences 
in religion “shall not prejudice any Austrian national in the exercise of civil 
rights,” and that Austrians who belonged to racial, religious, or other 
minorities “shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as 
the other Austrian nationals.”53
In fashioning the decision that struck down the Nazi Student Orders, the 
Constitutional Court judges were acutely aware of the political 
ramifications of their choices.  They disagreed on the core issues, and on 
how to explain these issues to a polarized and potentially violent audience.  
Their backroom colloquy and concerns paralleled internal discussions 
among the United States Supreme Court Justices in Brown about the effect 
that a desegregation decision would have on Southern sensibilities and 
tempers.
  These guarantees were cited by the District 
Criminal Court in its petition to the Constitutional Court for rescission of 
the challenged University regulations. 
54
The Austrian bench was large, with fourteen members.
 
55  Because 
tradition precluded dissenting and concurring opinions, they operated under 
the internal discipline of debating and voting on each approach until the 
final one was reluctantly embraced.56  Justices Ludwig Adamovich, 
Hermann Eckel, Ernst Durig, Georg Froehlich, and Arthur Lenhoff took the 
lead in suggesting strategies and specific wording. 57
 
 52. See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 4-5 for a summary of the collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy after Austria’s defeat in World War I and the establishment of 
an Austrian republic pursuant to terms of the peace treaty of Saint-Germain; and at 137 for a 
summary of the role of Hans Kelsen as the “father” of the Constitution of 1920.  For details 
of the developments of the Austrian republic in the years following 1918, see MALBONE W. 
GRAHAM, JR., NEW GOVERNMENTS OF CENTRAL EUROPE 132, 137, passim (1924) (“Never 
was a revolution carried out more peacefully and with more devout intentions.”). 
 
 53. See Treaty of St.-Germain, arts. 66 and 67, Part III ICL Document Status, Sept. 10 
,1919.  In 1934, a new Austrian Constitution launched by the administration of Chancellor 
Engelbert Dollfuss gave this equality provision another twist that made it malleable to 
executive power.  See infra Part I.G.2.a. 
 54. See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 55. HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 139. 
 56. Id. at 149.  The United States Supreme Court Justices deciding Brown also struggled 
to produce a unanimous opinion, which was facilitated by a change in the Court’s 
composition.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 584-85, 663-65, 683-84, 697-99 (1975). 
 57. The backgrounds and known political affiliations of these Justices provide a very 
limited basis for predicting their viewpoints and votes.  Dr. Adamovich, a University 
professor in Graz, was listed in treatises on the Court as neutral (which meant that he was 
appointed by the federal administration without prior nomination by a Parliamentary party); 
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1.   Nullification on Statutory Grounds: The Associations Law 
Minutes taken during the Justices’ deliberations show that their dialogue 
was courteous and free-flowing, although there was initial disagreement 
and a split vote on every issue.  The statutory challenge to the Orders was 
that any permanent organization must emanate from and be governed by 
the Austrian Associations Law.  Formation of the student groups by the 
Academic Senate violated this principle, and therefore a formal basis 
existed for prohibiting them. 
Disagreement centered on two points: whether the “Nations” were 
associations at all, and whether the students themselves retained a right to 
associate for common purposes regardless of any governing statute.  One 
Justice opined that the “Nations” were only auxiliaries to University 
authorities in administering “discipline.”58  Another countered that the 
Nations did have significant characteristics of associations because they 
could affiliate with external student organizations and collect dues.59  
Although Justice Adamovich was not part of the liberal wing, he 
nonetheless emphasized that “the entire framework provided by the Student 
Regulations could not be reconciled with the Associations Law.”60
Students could not themselves form a valid corporate body but they 
could apply for permission directly under the Associations Law and 
comply with its requirements, Justice Adamovich suggested.  Justice 
  Every 
permanent voluntary organization committed to a continuing purpose was 
an association.  Even if the Nations were regarded as a sui generis type of 
organization, a special law would be required. 
 
Dr. Durig, neutral, was President of the Constitutional Court; Dr. Eckel was apparently 
affiliated with the Greater Germany Party; Dr. Froehlich, neutral, was Vice President of the 
Court and Reporting Justice on the Student Orders decision (assigned to present a draft 
opinion at the deliberations); Dr. Lenhoff, a Professor at Vienna Law School, was not a 
member of a political party but was nominated by the Social Democrats.  Looking at the 
whole group of fourteen, six were categorized as neutral, one as a Social Democrat, two as 
neutral but leaning towards or nominated by Social Democrats, one as “Grdt,” and four as 
Christian Social. The Justices could continue to teach while serving on the Court.  Thomas 
Zavadil, Die Ausschaltung des Verfassungsgerichtshof 1933, Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung 
des Magistergrades der Philosophie and der Geisteswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der 
Universitaet Wien [The Exclusion of the Constitutional Court, 1933 (unpublished M.A. of 
Philosophy thesis, University of Vienna)] 42-43, 52, 262-266 (1997) (on file with the 
School of Liberal Arts of the University of Vienna) (Translation Aces trans., 2003) 
(translation on file with author). 
 58. Protokoll uber Beratung und Abstimmung des VfGH vom 19/20.6.1931 [Minutes of 
the Deliberations and Voting of the Constitutional Court, June 19-20 1931] AVA-VfGH, V 
2/31-11  at 7-8 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author) 
[hereinafter Deliberations]. 
 59. Id. at 8-9. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
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Lenhoff insisted that “fundamental rights included the right to proclaim 
oneself a member of a specific Nation.”  But the system inaugurated by the 
Academic Senate did not support such student rights; indeed, it suppressed 
them.  Membership must be based on free choice, he explained, never on 
compulsion.  Here, a student could be assigned to a Nation “without regard 
to whether he did or did not want to belong to it.”61
 The primacy of the Associations Law prevailed.  A crucial vote was 
taken and the eight-person majority agreed, with five dissents, that the Nazi 
Student Orders must be abrogated.
 
62
2.  The Constitutional Debates 
  The Justices’ logically-structured 
deliberations on the statutory question led to crisp explanations in the 
decision set out above.  In striking contrast, their clashing agendas on the 
constitutional challenge precluded the development of a coherent position, 
even on the question of whether to take at face value the Rector’s assertion 
that the Orders were merely an attempt to facilitate student preferences. 
The debate is notable for what it did not discuss.  What would the 
Academic Senate achieve by putting a government stamp on student 
divisions based on ethnic origin?  The German Student Body was already 
occupying a privileged position at the University, assisting the 
administration with “discipline,” influencing policy, affiliating with similar 
bodies outside of Austria, sometimes given faculty rooms for its political 
meetings while such spaces were off limits to other student groups, 
permitted with impunity to drive Jewish students out of classrooms.63
 
 61. Id. at 12.  Based on the information a student was obliged to provide to the 
University in data form with questions about ethnic origin, he would then be required to 
belong to an assigned nation.  Id. 
  Why 
was a new phase needed?  The Government-sponsored University’s 
subordination of religious and other minorities by packing them into 
Nations of “less value” (to use the Academic Senate’s own words) had both 
a practical and a prophetic significance.  In practical terms, the minority 
would be precluded from a prime benefit of equal treatment by 
government: sharing in the position of the strong.  In prophetic terms, the 
stigma that the German Student Body had attempted to impose by 
vituperation and violence on religious and other minorities would now 
 62. Id. at 9; see also Brigitte Fenz, Zur Ideologie Der “Volksbürgerschaft.” Die 
Studentenordnung der Universitaet Wien vom 8.April 1930 vor dem Verfassungsgerichtshof 
[The Ideology Of “Ethnic Citizenship,” the University of Vienna’s Student Regulations of 
April 8, 1930 before the Constitutional Court], ZEIT GESCHICHTE, Jan., 1978, at 134 
(Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author) [hereinafter Fenz I]. 
 63. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 93, 118; see also Hearing, supra note 2, at 3; CHARLES 
A. GULICK, AUSTRIA FROM HABSBURG TO HITLER 639-41 (1948). 
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achieve official University approval and acquire a forward motion. 
As counsel for the beleaguered editor who challenged the Student Orders 
had emphasized, judicial permission to segregate the University’s student 
body would be the first step towards undermining the edifice of equality 
and imposing segregation in employment, residence, and other areas of 
life.64  This prediction had been presented to the Court, but no reference 
was made to it in the polarized Justices’ dialogue.  During the same era in 
the American South, the pervasive intrusion of racism into every aspect of 
political and economic life had already been established.65
The issues that emerged in Austria were these: should the Court approve 
the concept of separate but equal student bodies?  If so, what would a valid 
basis for this separation be?  If the equality principle were no barrier to 
division predicated on “common points of view,” could there be other 
constitutional obstacles to such a division?  Should “ethnic origin” be used 
as a permissible example of a common point of view? 
 
Much of the subsequent disagreement centering around the validity of a 
separate-but-equal system does not identify that system as a compulsory 
one.  A motion that appeared to be a compromise was made by Justice 
Eckel.  The Court could note that division by Nation would not violate the 
Constitution if these Nations were accorded the same duties and rights, but 
the opinion should state that no finding had been made on whether in fact 
this equal allotment had occurred because the Student Orders had already 
been rescinded on other grounds.66
This approach, providing future encouragement to the Academic Senate 
without reaching a holding, sparked vigorous debate.  Justice Adamovich 
argued in support that the Treaty of Saint-Germain as incorporated into the 
Constitution had favored permitting the grouping of students into nations.
  In his draft, Justice Eckel did not 
contradict the Rector’s assertion that the regulations merely established 
voluntary groups. 
67  
He may have intended a reference to Article 67, Minority Protection, which 
provided that Austrian nationals belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic 
minorities have the right to establish their own schools and religious 
institutions as a matter of voluntary choice.  Yet, Adamovich did not 
mention the Treaty’s statement that such Austrians are entitled to “the same 
treatment . . .in law and in fact as other Austrian nationals,”68
 
 64. Hearing, supra note 2, at 7. 
 a 
constitutional provision that remained as a formidable barrier against any 
 65. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 66. Deliberations, supra note 58, at 13. 
 67. Id. at 14. 
 68. See supra, note 53;  Part I.C. 
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compulsory division. 
Another Justice voiced strong objections to Justice Eckel’s motion on 
the grounds that majority/minority separation on any basis was prohibited.  
Under the Constitution of the Universities, students may only be classified 
according to which school they attend, and whether or not they are regular 
students.  The Academic Senate could not construct a different, 
fragmenting set of divisions.69
Yes, it could, Justice Adamovich insisted.  And let’s insert this sentence 
into our decision: “Contrary to the legal opinion expressed in the petition of 
District Criminal Court I in Vienna, the Constitutional Court finds that 
classification of students according to specified common points of view” 
does not violate the principle of equality or any other constitutional 
provision if these groups have the same rights.
 
70
Justice Lenhoff, however, opened this point for discussion by approving 
any divisions arrived at by choice, but stating that “compulsory inclusion” 
would violate the Constitution and therefore could only be created “by 
law.”
  The District Criminal 
Court’s opinion as quoted by the High Court would have prohibited inter 
alia the voluntary divisions that the Academic Senate and the Rector had 
identified.  Adamovich did not unpack the question of whether his proposal 
would merely endorse the constitutionality of the groupings as 
characterized by the Rector. 
71  The use of the word “law” may not have been merely a reference 
to a statute, because the existing Constitution would continue to trump such 
a lesser provision.  Court President Durig and Vice President Froehlich also 
noted that establishment of compulsory organizations would require further 
law.72
Another vital question remained to be determined.  If divisions 
(voluntary or involuntary) could be predicated on a student’s background 
rather than on his regular enrollment, which factors in his background 
should count?  Justice Adamovich’s draft had expanded on Eckel’s 
proposal by suggesting that the Court should legitimate classification on 
the basis of “ethnic origin,” a principle that would have been new in 
Austrian law.
 
73
Justice Lenhoff emphasized that the Court had not yet decided the issue 
of whether division on ethnic grounds comported with the equality 
principle, and urged that the phrase “ethnic origin” was not only foreign to 
 
 
 69. Deliberations, supra note 58, at 13. 
 70. Id. at 16. 
 71. Id. at 12, 14. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 14. 
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the Constitution, but so vague that it could not pass constitutional muster.74  
He added as a compromise that if he were outvoted on this point, the draft 
should at least contain the phrase “if . . .the division into these groups 
accords with constitutional principles.”75
The Adamovich draft, even with the supplement suggested by Lenhoff, 
was opposed by another Justice on the grounds that the public would ignore 
any limiting clauses and would simply assume that the Court had approved 
the concept of “ethnic origin” grouping that the German Student Body of 
the University and the Academic Senate had intended.
 
76
These deliberations revealed some factors similar to those considered by 
the American judges in Brown: consciousness of external pressures, as well 
as conflict between the desire to reject segregation and the desire to 
propitiate its proponents.
 
77
A series of votes concluded the debates.  Without directly addressing the 
validity of compulsory division, a majority endorsed the principle that 
splitting the student body could comply with the Constitution if each group 
had the same rights and other legal requirements were met.
  The Austrian Justices acknowledged two 
outside forces in their colloquy: the University’s hope for validation of the 
Orders or at least guidance, and the German Student Body’s intense 
investment in the ethnic-origin power of exclusion. 
78  Next, the 
question of whether division “according to specified common points of 
view” should be approved was answered in the affirmative by a vote of 12 
to 1.79
On the critical issue of whether ethnic origin should be used as an 
acceptable example of this “common point of view,” the vote changed.  
President Durig took the lead in proposing that references to ethnic origin, 
the term favored by the German Student Body, must be dropped.
  The phrase “if . . .[this] classification . . .accords with constitutional 
principles” remained in the draft, without further explanation. 
80
 
 74. Id. at 14, 16-17. 
  Instead, 
 75. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original). 
 76. Id. at 18. 
 77. In the United States, however, the external influence pushed the Court towards 
abandoning rather than preserving segregation.  See infra Part II.B.1.b for discussion of the 
pressure exerted by the executive branch’s integration initiatives and determination to avoid 
damaging foreign relations, and the Court’s countervailing concern about soothing Southern 
sensibilities by establishing gradual desegregation timetables. 
 78. Deliberations, supra note 58, at 16, 18. 
 79. Id. at 19. 
 80. Id.; cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of the assumption that members of the same ethnic group have a common 
point of view and concluding that African-American students would have varying rather 
than monolithic opinions). 
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by a vote of 10 to 3, the word “nationality” was substituted.81
3.   Unanimity Without Agreement 
  It is 
significant that this term could fit an Austrian citizen who happened to be 
Jewish in a way that “ethnic origin” might not.  For example, the Saint-
Germain Treaty stated that Austrian nationals belonging to religious or 
racial minorities must receive the same treatment “as the other Austrian 
nationals.” 
If the Constitutional Court’s decision were evaluated only as a logical 
exercise separated from political exigencies, it would remain problematic.  
When viewed as a series of concessions made by opposing jurists, 
however, its raison d’etre begins to emerge.  Trapped in the tradition of 
unanimity, a judge who would write a rigorous opinion of his own is 
immersed in a group dynamic that he cannot control.  In this intense 
process, which lasted for two days, the Justices finally produced a 
“unanimous” document that frustrated the Academic Senate’s attempt to 
segregate the University of Vienna’s students. 
The prosecution against the newspaper editor which had generated the 
Constitutional Court’s historic decision was discontinued.  After the 
withdrawal of the libel charges against him, editor Ernst Klebinder stated: 
“I did not intend to insult anyone or attack anyone in his person or honor.  
My concern was merely to protect Austria’s highest educational institution 
from the shame of an order that made a mockery of morality, reason, and 
the constitution.”82
D.   The Constitutional Court’s Institutional Constraints and 
Doctrines 
 
The Austrian Constitutional Court appeared in some respects to have 
more complete control over constitutional controversies than the United 
States Supreme Court.  In contrast to America’s judicial system, where the 
lower federal courts dispose of the bulk of constitutional claims, Austria’s 
High Court was the sole body authorized to determine the constitutionality 
of laws.83
 
 81. Deliberations, supra note 58, at 19.  A 1922 decision of an Austrian administrative 
court had made clear that “nationality” was distinct from a biological or cultural community.  
PAULEY, supra note 2, at 88. 
  This centralized power was solidified in the Constitution of 
 82. See Fenz I, supra note 62, at 141. 
 83. See Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the 
Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183, 185-86 (1942).  The District 
Criminal Court, where the case commenced, could rule on questions such as whether the 
honor of the Rector had been insulted and whether the editor had failed to exercise press 
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1920, replacing a prior system that permitted other tribunals to issue 
inconsistent rulings that had no stare decisis effect.84
 As will be seen below, however, the Constitutional Court’s 
institutional authority was far more constricted than that of its American 
counterpart.  The Austrian Court was vulnerable to the legislature, 
restrained by its own civil code traditions, and—in the 1930’s—facing 
opposition from pervasive and violent pro-separation groups. 
 
1.   Finality of Rulings 
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once said of the 
Court: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible 
only because we are final.”85  This finality stems not only from the 
Justices’ top-of-the-judicial-pyramid position, but also from their 
protection against legislative assault on constitutional rulings.  It is the 
Supreme Court’s prerogative, claimed since Marbury v. Madison,86 to “say 
what the law is.”87  The members of the Court may jettison their own prior 
constitutional pronouncements, but Congress would violate separation-of-
powers principles if it trumped such pronouncements.88
The counter-majoritarian difficulty—the  existence of an unelected 
branch of government with this final authority to interpret and to nullify 
democratic enactments—has caused some discomfort both inside and 
outside the judiciary.
 
89
 
prudence. 
  Nevertheless, a recent call for a constitutional 
 84. Id. 
 85. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 86. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 87. Id. at 177. 
 88. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.A. 2000bb); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing the Court’s own prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986)).  The Supreme Court had previously held in Employment Division, Department 
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 919 (1990) that the government need only meet 
a rational relations test in prohibiting the use of peyote in religious practices.  In RFRA, 
Congress had acted to restore a higher tier compelling-interest test in cases where 
government action would clash with the First Amendment.  But the Supreme Court’s 
Boerne decision reclaimed its judicial turf, declaring that Congress had the power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment but no power to determine what qualifies as a constitutional 
violation.  521 U.S. at 536. 
 89. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rule of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 779, 781 (1989); Bob Herbert, In America, A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A29.  But cf. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of 
Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 456 (1994) (arguing that “the undercutting democracy 
objection unravels on closer inspection”).  For further discussion on judicial independence, 
see generally infra Part II.B.1 (discussing judicial independence). 
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amendment that would allow judicial decisions to be overruled by a simple 
majority in each house of Congress gained no momentum.90  The Drafters 
of the United States Constitution chose to create formidable roadblocks 
against any amendments, thus enhancing the inviolability of the Justices’ 
prior rulings.91
Not so in Austria.  Unlike the United States Constitution, the 
Constitution of Austria is easily amended.  Any legislative proposal may be 
raised to constitutional status merely by designating it as a “constitutional 
provision” and passing it by a two-thirds majority in the Nationalrat 
(National Council) of Parliament.
 
92  The resultant rule need not be 
incorporated into the actual text of the Constitution.  Therefore, in addition 
to the forty or more amendments appearing in the Constitution’s text, there 
are hundreds of constitutional provisions outside of the Constitution itself, 
often appearing in unexpected places.93
2.   Tradition and Judicial Self-Restraint 
  The Austrian justices therefore had 
no assurance that an unpopular ruling would finally dispose of a 
constitutional controversy. 
Our federal courts were modeled on the English judiciary, inheriting a 
common law tradition.  In a multi-layered analysis of judicial self-restraint, 
Judge Richard A. Posner notes that many of the matters that American 
judges must determine are “common law issues in a functional sense: the 
application of a body of judge-made law is required to decide them.”94  
Rejecting as simplistic the equation of self-restraint with “goodness” and 
judicial activism with “badness,” Posner suggests that a judge’s choices 
must depend in part on the particular historical context of the case.  If Chief 
Justice Marshall had exercised judicial self-restraint in deciding Marbury v. 
Madison, his choice could now be viewed as a disaster.95
 
 90. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 117 (1996) (suggesting that 
such an amendment as the “only” means to bring the federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, “back to constitutional legitimacy.”).  Bork later abandoned his proposal, concluding 
that this kind of amendment would be ineffective.  Robert H. Bork, Reins on Judges: A 
Long Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A32. 
  The Framers of 
the United States Constitution knew that judges made law, yet they 
established a federal judiciary with life-time tenure.  They crafted this 
 91. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72-74 (2d. ed. 1991) (discussing 
the difficulties of obtaining a constitutional amendment). 
 92. See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 19-20. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 5-6 
(1983). 
 95. Id. at 14. 
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assurance of independence in the expectation that the judiciary would 
vigorously protect individual rights against encroachment by the legislature 
and the executive.96  In doing so, the self-disciplined judge tries to decide a 
case without bringing in personal policy preferences.97
Posner concludes that judicial activism in its contemporary form has 
departed from this self-discipline and “gone too far.”
 
98  He uses as an 
example Chief Justice Earl Warren’s judicial philosophy as described by 
Warren’s biographer, Professor G. Edward White.  Warren, who 
shepherded the Justices into unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education, 
conceived of craftsmanship as “knowing what results best harmonized with 
the ethical imperative of the Constitution and how best to encourage other 
justices to reach those results.”99
Posner acknowledges that there are (limited) areas in the law where 
judicial skill alone is insufficient to decide a case and therefore “big ideas” 
must be introduced.
 
100  Such policy choices became arbitrary, however, 
unless they are confined to values that are “widely . . . held.”101
If we apply this Posner criterion to the Brown decision, what result?  
Professor Michael Klarman has offered the view that by the 1950s, 
traditional Southern segregationist attitudes were already being altered by 
Cold War imperatives and regional linkages through television and 
interstate travel.
 
102  Other historians such as Richard Kluger, however, 
have suggested that desegregation became a widely held goal in part 
because of the Brown opinion’s impetus.103
 
 96. Id. at 15-16. 
  This would reverse the 
sequence of judicial choice and popular approval envisioned by Posner’s 
 97. Id. at 23. 
 98. Id. at 17. 
 99. Id. (quoting G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 229-30 (1982) (summarizing 
Chief Justice Warren’s approach to constitutional interpretation). 
 100. Id. at 24. 
 101. Id. at 24.  Judge Posner is not referring here to the Brown decision in particular.  As 
examples of subjects on which there is no ethical consensus, Posner cites abortion, capital 
punishment, and prison “amenities.”  Id. at 17. 
 102. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the challenges to Brown’s predicates and primacy). 
 103. KLUGER, supra note 56, at 709-10, stating: 
Since the expedient demolition of reconstruction, white America had lost 
enthusiasm for the enabling language of equalitarianism . . . .  Denied high skills 
or advanced learning, . . . [the African-American] remained a superfluous and 
lower order of American being, excess baggage in the nation’s race to prosperity 
and greatness.  The law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, had pronounced it 
permissible—indeed it was normal and expected—to degrade black America. 
It was into this moral void that the Supreme Court under Earl Warren now stepped.  Its 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, for all its economy, represented nothing short of a 
reconsecration of American ideals. 
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approach. 
In Austria, judicial choices were constricted by tradition.  The Justices 
were operating under a Roman-law-based civil code, a statutory system 
with little space for customary law and no recognition of judge-made law 
as formal precedent for future cases and parties.104  As eminent Austrian 
scholars such as Dr. Herbert Hausmaninger have observed, the Court took a 
narrow view of its proper role: “[I]n the tradition of Hans Kelsen’s Vienna 
School of Legal Positivism, it considered itself a ‘prisoner of the words of 
the Constitution’ subject to ‘strict construction’ interpreting civil rights in a 
more formal sense than most other European courts.”105
3.   De Facto Segregation Inside and Outside Austrian Universities 
  Self-restraint was 
a given.  Evasion of responsibility, however, was not.  It should be noted 
that the Justices could have avoided dealing with any aspect of the Nazi 
Student Orders case simply by adopting the Rector’s jurisdictional 
objections and returning the controversy to the court below, but this course 
was unacceptable.  As the minutes of their deliberations revealed, some of 
the Justices were prepared to issue a broad affirmation of the Constitution’s 
anti-segregation equality principle.  They were unable to marshal 
unanimity on this view, and release of several discordant opinions would 
not only have been blocked by tradition but would also have clouded the 
Court’s authority to resolve the issues.  Instead, the Justices unanimously 
nullified the Student Orders by turning to a statutory resolution that was 
consonant with the Austrian legal system’s code-based foundation. 
As the Justices fully understood, opposition to segregation based on 
religion was not a “widely held” value.  By 1931, following the huge Nazi 
electoral victory in Germany the preceding year, Nazi students at Vienna 
University were able to take control of the German Student Body.106  Their 
power was enhanced by affiliation with like-minded groups in Germany, 
and the use of arms supplied by Hitler-based organizations.107  Turning 
their attention to the faculty, the Nazi students published lists of Jewish 
professors—most of whom were internationally known scholars—for the 
purpose of organizing boycotts of their classes.108
 
 104. See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 22, 138, 229. 
  Other faculty members 
who were sympathetic to these objectives worked quietly to prevent the 
 105. Id. at 147.  The Court also operated under the principle of “interpretation in favor of 
constitutionality.”  Id. at 165. 
 106. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 125-27. 
 107. See infra Part I.F.2 (describing the battle in the Austrian Parliament). 
 108. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 195. 
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advancement of any academics whose religion or opinions were suspect.109
In every region, the culture outside the universities was also inhospitable 
to the integration of Jews into Austrian life.  We can turn to private 
recreational organizations to find examples.  The Deutscher Turnerbund 
1919 (German Gymnasts’ League 1919), which had 115,000 members by 
1932, regarded contact with Jews as contaminating.
 
110  The 250,000 
member German-Austrian Alpine Club—hardly an intimate association—
followed an exclusionary and segregationist line.111
The spectrum among political and occupational groups included the 
League of Anti-Semites, which defined a Jew as anyone with a Jewish 
great-grandparent and advocated legal separation of Jews and non-Jews in 
education and the administration of justice;
 
112 the Greater German People’s 
Party, which favored Anschluss with Germany, and viewed treatment of 
Jews as a separate nation as the only means of combating their immoral 
“racial” characteristics;113 peasant farmers who were historically anti-
Semitic only at times when their particular economic interests were at 
issue;114 and the Social Democratic Party, which favored progressive 
housing and education programs and had many Jewish members.115
Bias also affected intellectuals, as evidenced by patterns in professions 
such as law and medicine.  Professional organizations were legally 
permitted to discriminate in their membership because they were private.
  The 
Social Democrats criticized “Jewish capitalists” but avoided anti-Semitism 
in their official party platform. 
116  
A union of physicians excluded Jews unless they had “honorably” become 
Christians.117
 
 109. Id. at 121. 
  Vienna’s Chamber of Lawyers, to which all attorneys 
belonged, was split in 1932 when many non-Jews formed their own League 
 110. Id. at 118-19. 
 111. Id. at 117-18; see also infra Part III.B (discussing efforts under American law to 
address the problem of large private organizations with discriminatory membership 
policies). 
 112. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 183-85. 
 113. Id. at 180-81. 
 114. Id. at 175.  But, the Austrian Heimwehr or Home Guard, a paramilitary group, had 
many peasant members from traditionally völkish and anti-Semitic areas like Carinthia and 
Styria who combined religious distrust of Jews, hatred of socialism, and alienation from 
metropolitan Vienna.  Id.  By 1934, the Heimwehr was no longer admitting Jews as 
members.  Id. at 176. 
 115. Id. at 77-78. 
 116. Id. at 117.  Lawyers could also refuse clients on religious grounds.  Physicians and 
apothecaries, however, were legally bound to serve anyone who requested assistance.  Id. at 
119-20. 
 117. Id. at 120. 
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of German-Aryan Lawyers of Austria.118
E.   The Aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s Decision 
 
1.   Attempts to Reestablish segregation by unlawful and lawful means 
News of the Constitutional Court’s ruling generated an enormous 
upsurge of violence.  The German Student Body terrorized and beat non-
member students.119  Signs reading “No Jews Allowed” were put on the 
pillars of the University’s entrance.  A hundred Nazi students, most in party 
insignia, marched from the courtroom to the University and joined 
hundreds of other Nazis in attacking Socialist and Jewish students with 
rubber truncheons and steel clubs.120  Campus guards did not intervene, 
and University Rector Uebersberger protested when the municipal police 
went up the ramp of the University building in an attempt to ward off the 
assailants.121
Demonstrators against the decision in the University’s main lecture hall 
announced: 
  He also prohibited the police from entering the building.  Out 
of gratitude, Nazi students serenaded the Rector a few days afterwards. 
We can no longer tolerate the presence of the people who for years have 
been befouling the German Student Body and student power with venom 
and rage at a university that notwithstanding all Constitutional Court 
rulings is and will remain a German teaching and research institution.  We 
shall occupy the entrances to the university and shall not allow Jews to 
enter institutions of higher learning.122
As a result of these demonstrations, the University of Vienna was closed 
for the rest of the academic year except for those who were taking final 
examinations.  The Academic Senate announced in November, 1931, 
however, that it approved of the German Student Body’s goals and 
methods. 
 
Similar riots occurred after the Brown decision.  At the University of 
Alabama and the University of Mississippi, newly admitted students like 
Autherine Lucy and James Meredith were threatened by mobs that 
attempted to prevent them from attending classes because they were 
African-Americans.123
 
 118. Id. 
  In Alabama, Lucy was expelled and the University 
 119. Fenz I, supra note 62, at 140. 
 120. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 126. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Fenz I, supra note 62, at 140. 
 123. See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
CHRISTENSENMARCUS 2/3/2011  9:57 PM 
124 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
of Alabama remained segregated for seven more years.  In Mississippi, the 
Governor announced that integration was unconstitutional, and three-
hundred national troops stayed at the University for another year to 
maintain order and protect Meredith. 
No such protection was provided to the beleaguered students at the 
University of Vienna.  A nationalistic Austrian newspaper proclaimed that 
the Constitutional Court was an enemy of the German people.  In an odd 
inversion of fact, the article stated that the German-Austrians were being 
used as “a kind of punching bag,” and then went on to declare: “Jews must 
no longer pervert Roman law on German soil.  Rather, German judges must 
again pronounce German law in German countries.”  The paper referred to 
“four Jews” who rendered the “disgraceful ruling” and demanded 
nullification of the decision.124
The call for nullification was not ignored.  Education Minister Czermak 
asked the Council of Ministers for permission to prepare a bill that would 
authorize separate student groupings in Austrian institutions of higher 
learning.
 
125
2.   Opposition to University Segregation 
  Justice Adamovich, who had participated actively in the 
Court’s decision, was one of the experts brought in to draft such a bill. 
During the year that the Nazi Student Orders were in effect, voluntarily 
formed cliques had been transformed into government-endorsed barriers 
between students, enhancing the “privileged status” of “German Student 
Nation” members.126
If this were merely an academic game . . . , we could still resign ourselves 
to it.  When all is said and done, however, the future masters, leaders, 
administrators, jurists, and industrial and business managers of Austria are 
being trained at the University.  They are being imbued from an early age 
with the idea that membership in the Aryan race is a legally circumscribed 
and privileged sphere.
  Assessing the larger impact of these occurrences, a 
liberal Viennese newspaper had commented: 
127
The Constitutional Court’s nullification of this segregation was 
celebrated in a Jewish weekly newspaper, Die Wahrheit, which described 
the decision as particularly welcome “in this harsh and difficult time of 
crisis in Austria, these difficult hours of struggle between existence and 
 
 
 124. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Fenz I, supra note 62, at 141. 
 126. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 125-26; see also GULICK, supra note 63, at 639-41. 
 127. Legalisierung des Arienparagraphen  [Legalization of the Aryan Paragraphs], 
WEINER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Vienna) Apr. 11, 1930, at 1. (Translation Aces trans. 2001-
2003) (translation on file with author). 
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non-existence, this period so rich in disappointments.”128
It should be noted that Jews living in Vienna in the 1930’s were a 
heterogeneous group with striking differences in wealth, religious outlook, 
and places of origin.
  The paper 
proclaimed that the ruling was “a victory for law.” 
129  The majority were probably the poor, divided into 
their own social hierarchy.  At the bottom were beggars, shoe-shiners, and 
sellers of newspapers; slightly higher in income were tailors and 
peddlers.130  Most of these were immigrants from the former eastern 
provinces of the Empire, the despised “Ostjuden” that were a particular 
target of pan-German propaganda.131
In brief, among the organized factions were the Liberals, the Jewish 
Nationalists, the Socialists, and the Orthodox.  The assimilationist Liberals 
centered their efforts on legal defense in the courts, personal meetings with 
officials, and protests submitted to the government.
 
132  The Jewish 
Nationalists were splintered into many factions but agreed that Jews should 
be recognized as a separate nation, either as a minority in countries like 
Austria or as a majority in their own state.133  The Socialists concentrated 
on addressing the economic and social welfare of those in need.134  The 
smallest group was the Orthodox Jews, generally immigrants from 
Hungary and Galicia who wanted neither a modern secular Jewish state nor 
assimilation into Austrian society.135  Disagreements among these groups 
occurred within the Jewish communal organization of Vienna, the 
Israelitische Kultusgemeinde (“IKG”) Wien.136
Both the Liberals and the Jewish Nationalists actively opposed the Nazi 
Student Orders, but for quite different reasons.  The Liberals objected 
because the Orders in effect defined Jews as a race, rather than as adherents 
of a religion.
  In the early 1930’s the 
IKG was controlled by Liberals organized into the Union of Austrian Jews. 
137
 
 128. Ernst Feldsberg, Der Freiheit eine Gasse [Road Clear], JÜDISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
DIE WAHRHEIT, June 26, 1931, at 1 (Translation Aces trans. 2001-2003) (translation on file 
with author). 
 The Jewish Nationalists rejected the Orders because the 
 129. See HARRIET PASS FREIDENREICH, JEWISH POLITICS IN VIENNA 1918-1938 (1991). 
 130. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 216. 
 131. Id. at 177, 216; see also id. at 80 (“[The] persecution and banishment [of the 
Ostjuden] have become a popular sport.”) (quoting a Zionist daily paper). 
 132. See FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 26. 
 133. Id. at 4-5. 
 134. Id. at 2. 
 135. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 226.  The Orthodox constituted approximately 20% of 
the Viennese Jewish community.  Id. 
 136. Id. at 226. 
 137. See FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 185. 
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division into “Nations” was compulsory, precluding individual Jews from 
choosing their own nationality.138
When the Union of Austrian Jews became aware that the Ministry of 
Education was working on a legislative proposal to revive the Nations, the 
Union presented a desperate plea to Dr. Karl Buresch, Austria’s 
Chancellor: 
 
 We view the planned assertion of the racial-anti[-S]emitic position at 
Austrian institutes of higher education as an attempt to remove the first 
stone from the edifice of equal rights for all Austrian citizens, preparing 
the enactment of the National Socialist program for the treatment of Jews 
in the “Third Reich.” . . .  We nourish the hope that Herr Bundeskanzler, 
as head of the government, will subject our concerns and reservations 
resting on constitutional grounds to reconsideration and do all in his 
power to protect the Jewish population of Austria that had at all times 
been loyally supporting the state, and whose ancestors have lived in this 
country for over a thousand years, from suffering a diminution of its 
rights.”139
F.   The 1932 Legislative “End Run” Around the Constitutional 
Court’s Decision 
 
1.   The Chancellors’ strategy meeting 
Because the Constitutional Court had blocked the continuation of 
segregated student groups at the University, legislation was necessary to 
overcome both statutory and constitutional obstacles.  A remarkable 
archival document shows that on November 25, 1931—months before a 
proposed bill was introduced in the Nationalrat (National Council)—the 
Austrian Chancellor Dr. Karl Buresch met with the Vice Chancellor and a 
group of federal ministers to discuss strategies that could enhance the bill’s 
passage.140
The Education Minister, Dr. Czermak, described the legislative proposal 
and stated that groupings would be predicated solely on “ethnic origin.”
 
141
 
 138. Id. 
  
No other basis would be allowed.  Another minister said that the 
 139. Die “Union” Im Abwehrkampf gegen das “Studentenrecht” [The “Union” fights 
“Student Law”], DIE WAHRHEIT (Vienna) Dec. 18, 1931, at 4 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-
2003) (translation on file with author). 
 140. Ministerratsprotokoll Nr. 748, 9, vom. 25. November 1931 [Minutes of the Council 
of Ministers Meeting of November 25, 1931, No. 748, 9], passim (Translation Aces trans. 
2001-2003) (translation on file with author). 
 141. Id. at 3. 
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Government would be in a difficult situation if it presented the bill in 
Parliament only to suffer defeat because of objections from opposing 
parties.142
In response, Dr. Czermak assured the officials present that important 
parties were already behind the proposal, and indicated that he would 
promote it with another powerful party, the Christian Socials.
  If there were such a defeat, “certain events” could occur on 
academic soil.  This might lead to termination of University autonomy.  
Therefore, it was “absolutely necessary” that the Chancellor speak to the 
Social Democrats in advance. 
143
2.   The battle in Parliament 
  He also 
emphasized, however, that preparation for the debate must proceed “with 
all due speed.”  Members of the German Student Body were soon to meet 
and would be angry if there were no message about the Government’s 
intention to forward the legislation. 
The debate in the National Council of the Austrian Parliament took place 
on April 29, 1932.144
The bill designed to nullify the Constitutional Court’s decision was 
entitled “A Law about a Student Order at Universities.”
  The National Council generally held three separate 
sessions on each proposed bill, and then voted.  Members speaking for or 
against the proposal sometimes elicited cheers or cat-calls by political 
factions which were explicitly identified in the transcript of the 
proceedings. 
145  In brief, it 
proposed an amendment to the Associations Law stating that academic 
authorities could approve the establishment of student associations under 
the principle of ethnic origin.146  Approval may be granted “only” if this 
association’s by-laws require students to “prove” their affiliation to a Volk 
(people) on the grounds of ethnic extraction and language.147
Introducing the legislation, Minister Czermak proceeded in bland 
 
 
 142. Id. at 4-5. 
 143. Id. at 5-6.  Chancellor Buresch ended the discussion by stating that the 
Government’s budget legislation must be passed in Parliament before presentation of the 
student associations bill, because discussion of the latter might become too disruptive.  He 
directed the Education Minister to continue his lobbying efforts to revive the nations.  Id. 
 144. Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2063. 
 145. 293 der Beilagen. Nationalrat. IV Gesetzgebungsperiode 1. Vorlage der 
Bundesregierung, Bundesgesetz vom. 1932 über eine Studentenschaftsordnung an den 
Hochschulen [National Council Bill of 1932 about a Student Body Order in Universities], at 
1 (Translation Aces trans. 2001-2003) (translation on file with author). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (noting also that no group except one based on ethnic origin would be permitted 
under this bill). 
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abstractions.  He did not pursue the suggestion that a general student 
representative body should be established with equal voting by all students.  
Instead, he stressed the importance of preserving the “German character” of 
the University through ethnic-origin guarantees.148
The other speakers in this illuminating debate did not hold back from 
addressing the real purpose of the bill: to prevent Jews from claiming an 
Austrian identity and to exclude them from participation in the privileges of 
the German Student Body.  A Christian Social supporter of the legislation, 
Council Member Richard Schmitz, teetered between complaining about 
Austrian Jews and professing his affection for them.  They are competitors 
for jobs and adherents of the wrong political camp, he explained.
  This would assure 
peace and order and protect the students’ right of self-administration.  
Without elaboration, he stated that the High Court’s decision had posed no 
constitutional problem for a bill establishing separate student groups.  He 
did not discuss the difference between the decision’s use of the word 
“nationality” with its implications of Austrian citizenship as a qualification 
for membership in a German Student Body, and the bill’s repeated use of 
the divisive word “ethnic origin” as a mandatory qualification. 
149  The 
younger generation of German-Austrians are anti-Semitic in part because 
they have difficulty advancing as doctors, jurists, philosophers.  Yet the 
Social Democratic party favors Jewish doctors (transcript notes “agreement 
from the right”), and Jewish lawyers are rising in Social Democratic 
circles.  Most Jews are anti-clerical and vote for Social Democratic 
candidates.  He nonetheless expressed doubt about “racial” theories, noting 
that such theories are still subjective and can change as scholarly opinion 
develops.150  He assured his hearers that he and other Catholics had no 
hatred towards Jews as a people or as a “race,” and were aware of a duty to 
love our neighbors (cry from the right, “very correct”).151  Although 
Christians and Jews don’t have the same beliefs, he suggested, they both 
still worship the one God.  In particular, he urged, we must not sin against 
committed Jewish converts by denying their sincerity.  Those who accept 
our beliefs uprightly are in the religious sense our brothers (lively 
agreement from the right).152
Militant approval was expressed by Dr. Franz Hueber, who made no 
  But, he concluded, that does not mean that 
the Jewish convert is therefore a German.  We (Christian Socials) favor this 
legislation. 
 
 148. See Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2063-65. 
 149. Id. at 2077-78. 
 150. Id. at 2081. 
 151. Id. at 2078. 
 152. Id. at 2083. 
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effort to tone down his message.  It matters which “race” our judges, 
advocates, doctors and teachers are, he stated.153  Workers, farmers, 
everyone should be concerned about who is coming out of the universities.  
We can distinguish between a German-blooded man and a Jew.  Unfurling 
statistics about the components of the student body, he noted that in the 
winter semester of 1930/1931, there were 8285 students entitled to vote as 
members of the German Student Body but only 932 Jewish students.  
Germans are by far the largest group and therefore the German people 
“have the right to judge and to rule the University.”154  Hueber concluded 
that it was the duty of every German-blooded member of this House to 
fight for passage of the bill.  (Transcript notes “applause on the extreme 
right.”)155
Opposing this view, former Under-Secretary of State for Education Otto 
Glöckel gave a pungent presentation that focused on issues omitted by the 
supporting speakers: the scale of the violence in the University, its sources, 
and the hypocrisy of those who condoned the assaults.  He noted that 
German Student Body gangs formed rings, through which disfavored 
students were forced to pass.
 
156  These gangs were armed with brass 
knuckles, rubber truncheons, and even guns introduced into the school by 
Hitler-based organizations.  Twenty against one, and of course the twenty 
are victors.  The lives of impoverished students are made heavy by this and 
their studies are hindered, but the nuances of anti-Semitism do not preclude 
the University Rector from having afternoon tea with Mr. Rothschild.157  
(Transcript notes a shout of “Quiet!” and interruptions from various 
quarters.  Presiding Officer pleads for order.)  Ultimately, Glöckel 
predicted, those who eat of the swastika will die from it.158
One forgets, he continued, that state-sponsored universities exist to 
provide an atmosphere in which all students are free to do research and to 
learn.  Every exception to such freedom violates the law.  (Minister 
  (Merriment 
from the left, cat-calls from the right). 
 
 153. Id. at 2090. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 2092. 
 156. Id. at 2084-85. 
 157. Id. at 2084.  According to Ernst Klebinder, the beleaguered editor whose 
prosecution was the impetus for the Austrian Court’s desegregation decision, the Rector of 
the University of Vienna went to Louis Rothschild, the head of the Rothschild family, to 
assure him that there was “nothing in the new student regulations that is directed against the 
Jews,” and to ask him to “make contributions to individual university institutes.”  See From 
the Courtroom, supra note 4, at 3. 
 158. Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2084. 
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Czermak, interrupting: “There’s nothing one-sided in the bill”).159  Glöckel 
responded that the administration is asking Parliament to shed its innocence 
by joining with the agitators in an attempt to legalize an unconstitutional 
incursion on the equality that is an attribute of citizenship.  This is the first 
step towards creation of a racist state.  German mother-tongue is not 
enough to entitle an applicant to membership in the German Student Body, 
nor are five or ten prior generations of ancestors in Austria.  We’re letting 
fanatical youngsters dictate what equality of citizenship is, and to exclude 
not only Jews but also any working-class Aryans who discomfit the young 
Nazis.  Kids who have never had to earn any money are saying to these 
applicants, “you’re not a [worthy] German.”160
Further opposition was voiced by a noted debater, Council Member Karl 
Leuthner.  He not only rebutted Minister Czermak’s justifications point-by-
point, but went on to illumine the German-Austrian culture and wisdom 
that the bill would destroy.  Members of the German Student Body, who 
have been issued uniforms under the supervision of the Rector, have 
continued to terrorize other students despite the Constitutional Court’s 
decision.
 
161  Legalizing this regime and its protection by the Rector would 
not establish law and order, he explained.  Nor would it enshrine freedom 
of association, because grouping by choice is not the reality here.  The 
Minister has claimed that membership in a student association is 
completely voluntary and strongly stressed this principle.  Yet members 
can in their discretion deny admittance to others.  And this admittance is 
not merely to an association as a kind of student club, but to a government-
established Nation with very special features.162
And what does the word “race,” the basis for these groupings, actually 
mean?
 
163
 
 159. Id. 
  Nordics are only 10% of our population, he noted.  Does that 
leave us all as bastards, including Goethe, Schiller, and Beethoven, the 
greatest musical genius in history?  If it’s more important to be Nordic than 
to be imbued with German culture, then what does it mean to be German?  
Jews, who have been here for centuries, include writers and composers like 
Heine and Mendelsohn who built our art and history.  Education Minister 
Czermak has acknowledged that someone who was not every-drop-of-
blood German could be found in the German Student Body.  Yes, Leuthner 
commented sarcastically, neither Czermak nor Buresch are exactly German 
names.  But, those who speak our language as natives, who embrace our 
 160. Id. at 2084, 2087-88. 
 161. Id. at 2074. 
 162. Id. at 2066. 
 163. Id. 
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culture, and who are fulfilled by our spirit, are German even if their family 
names are not. 
He continued with the question, must the cross bow to the swastika?164  
Minister Czermak has said that baptized Jews will nevertheless be placed in 
the Jewish group and not in the German Student Body.  Therefore, 
somebody could be German in culture, language, and ideals with three 
Catholic grandparents and generations of Catholic ancestors, but “if one of 
his grandmothers has just a smidgeon of Jewish blood, this Jewish blood is 
stronger than the baptism of centuries . . . .”165
Minister Czermak, you say this “principle” is German.  Yet students 
from Germany have published a letter from the German Catholic Center 
and democratic student organizations urging you to “ensure the 
establishment in Austria’s universities of a student association not legally 
anchored in the brutal despotism of a party but rather based on the principle 
of citizenship by operation of law . . . .”
  Catholic theorists and 
writers have condemned the “myth of blood” and the “race principle.” 
166
The Minister’s proposed legislation denies everything that is significant 
in Austrian culture and destroys its entire spiritual capital.  It violates 
association law, republican and democratic principles, and the rights of 
workers, Leuthner concluded.  We will fight you because passage of this 
bill would constitute the first legal recognition of the blood and race 
theories of the Nazis!
 
167
After this intense debate in the National Council, the bill was referred to 
a Parliamentary Committee.  It was scheduled for a second reading, but 
was never debated again and disappeared.
  (Clapping from the left). 
168
G.   The Dwindling of Democracy: Riots and a Repressive 
Constitution 
 
As the history of segregation in America and Austria demonstrates, 
moral rights are fragile without the support of powerful institutions.  Jim 
Crow laws in the South subjugated all Blacks, regardless of class, character 
or learning.  A Southern politician justified disenfranchisement by 
proclaiming that no Black in the world could measure up to “the least, 
poorest, lowest-down white man I ever knew.”169
 
 164. Id. 
  Two branches of the 
 165. Id. at 2071. 
 166. Id. at 2072. 
 167. Id. at 2074. 
 168. Id. at 2093. 
 169. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 107 (2d ed. 1966). 
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federal government eventually acted to dismantle Jim Crow.  When the 
judiciary rejected “separate but equal” schools in Brown, it was proceeding 
in accord with the executive.  President Harry S. Truman had issued orders 
prohibiting discrimination in federal employment and ending segregation in 
the armed forces.170
By contrast, the Austrian court stood alone in overturning the 
segregation edict, opposed rather than buttressed by the executive.
 
171
1.   The Rise of Authoritarian Austria 
  The 
subsequent administration of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, which will be 
discussed below, abided by the Court’s 1931 ruling but engineered 
constitutional changes that curtailed the judiciary’s prior independence and 
jurisdiction. 
The riots that followed the High Court’s decision caught the attention of 
eminent members of the American Medical Association who were officials 
of a league for the protection of foreign students in Vienna.172  These 
physicians protested to the Austrian government, to the American envoy in 
Austria, to the Rector of the University of Vienna, to President Herbert 
Hoover, and to all United States newspapers with wide circulation.  The 
protest letter called the Nazi students “cowardly” and noted that the Rector 
had failed to protect the victims, some of whom were American medical 
students.173
These objections were viewed as hypocritical by an Austrian journal, 
which proclaimed that racial segregation was strictly enforced in the 
American South against anyone having a drop of Black blood.
  The American envoy continued to issue objections and 
warnings as subsequent waves of anti-Semitic student violence occurred. 
174  The 
young Christian Social Chancellor of Austria, Engelbert Dollfuss, 
expressed sympathy, however, with the American position, indicating 
annoyance with the “gross stupidity” of the Nazi students and promising 
assistance.175  Dollfuss was not only responding to foreign pressure,176
 
 170. Id. at 136; see also infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 but 
 171. The legislature abandoned further discussion of the executive’s proposed 
segregation bill, but never voted on it.  See supra Part I.F.2 and note 168. 
 172. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 128. 
 173. Id.  George Earle, the American envoy, publicly announced that trade relations with 
America could be adversely affected unless the Austrian Government rejected 
discrimination based on ethnic origin.  See id. at 265. 
 174. Id. at 265. 
 175. Id. at 129.  This statement was made in a meeting with the American Ministry after a 
flare-up of violence in 1932, where Nazis set upon Jewish students with steel clubs and 
knives, injuring several Americans. 
 176. Id.  Envoys from other governments joined America’s protest, which was publicized 
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also acting to block an Anschluss with Germany following Hitler’s 1933 
consolidation of power there.177
Abandonment of Austria’s prior democratic institutions was Dollfuss’s 
method of enforcing his goals.  Two months after Hitler became the 
German Chancellor, all three speakers of the Austrian Parliament resigned 
in an argument over a minor voting procedure.
 
178  Dollfuss took this 
opportunity to declare that Parliament had suspended itself and that he 
would now rule under an unrepealed Emergency Decree promulgated at the 
time of the First World War.179  Realizing that the Nazis had been winning 
local elections, Dollfuss refused to allow Parliament to reconvene.180  In a 
series of dramatic moves, he outlawed the Communist Party and the Nazi 
Party, and forbade future elections.181  Socialist workers in Linz, protesting 
these increasing signs of dictatorship, staged a revolt that was crushed in 
three days.182  Dollfuss outlawed the Social Democratic Party in February 
1934, and vast numbers of its members were arrested.183
An authoritarian corporate state had now supplanted Austrian 
democracy, and inaugurated a new Constitution that ultimately fostered the 
swift establishment of segregation when the Nazis came to full power.  
This Constitution crafted crucial changes in the civil liberties of Austrian 
citizens, and replaced the Constitutional Court with a new Constitutional 
and Administrative Court (Bundesgerichtshof) that merged two prior 
tribunals to form a new entity with drastically reduced powers.
 
184
 
in Austria and abroad.  The newly elected Rector of the University apologized to the 
American envoy, and threatened to expel or even institute criminal prosecution against 
disorderly students.  A pro-Nazi newspaper characterized this apology as humiliating, and 
noted that students who had Jewish names were not really American, regardless of 
citizenship.  Id. 
  Only 
four of the fourteen High Court Justices who had struck down the Nazi 
Student Orders were favored with an appointment to this new 
 177. Id. at 261.  The Austrian government, as a condition of accepting a loan, had to 
agree with a League of Nations prohibition against union with Germany.  Anton Staudinger, 
‘Austria’-The Ideology of Austrofacism, in AUSTRIA IN THE THIRTIES: CULTURE AND 
POLITICS 8 (Kenneth Segar & John Warren eds. 1991) [hereinafter AUSTRIA IN THE 
THIRTIES]. 
 178. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 260. 
 179. Kenneth Segar & John Warren, Preface to AUSTRIA IN THE THIRTIES, supra note 
177, at i, ii.  This move had been supported by Benito Mussolini, the leader of Italy, who 
appeared at the time to be a protector of Dollfuss. 
 180. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 260-61. 
 181. Id. at 186, 261-62; Segar & Warren, supra note 179, at ii-iii. 
 182. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 147, 266. 
 183. FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 96; Segar & Warren, supra note 179, at iii. 
 184. AUS. CONST. art. 163 (1934); GULICK, supra note 63, passim. 
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replacement.185
2.  How the 1934 Constitution Deconstructed Individual Rights and 
Liberties 
 
Austria is a democratic republic and its law emanates from the people, 
said the Constitution that had governed in 1929.186  In 1934, the new 
Constitution’s preamble proclaimed: “In the Name of Almighty God from 
Whom All Justice Emanates, the Austrian People Receives for its Christian 
German Federal State on a Corporative Foundation this Constitution.”187  
Appropriately, the country’s coat of arms metamorphosed from a single-
headed eagle with a crown on its head188 to a double-headed eagle topped 
by a halo.189
A Constitution that accorded comprehensive individual rights had been 
replaced by one sporting a Bill of Rights perforated by amorphous 
exceptions.  The 1934 creation abolished universal suffrage and established 
a “corporative” regime where the interests of state-defined groups 
transcend those of individuals.
 
190
This system inaugurated a government of men, not of laws, although it 
operated through a constant effusion of new statutes.  Concepts of equality, 
association, and citizenship were distorted and undermined by the 
Constitution itself and by the legislation purporting to implement it, 
creating only an illusion of national unity. 
  Representatives are selected with 
administration approval only from these groups, allowing for top-down 
control over the results. 
 
 185. Oesterreichisches Amts-Kalendar fur das Jahr 1936 59. Jahrgang des hof-und 
Staatshandbuches, II Abschnitt Bundesgerichtshof [Austrian Calendar and Handbook for 
Bundesgerichtshof, 1936] (showing new slate of Justices with only Ernst Durig (the 
President of the prior Constitutional Court), Georg Froehlich (the Vice-President of the prior 
Court), and Justices Hermann Eckel and Adolf Wanschura on the roster).  The 1933 
calendar and handbook for the Constitutional Court showed ten other Justices who had 
participated in the vote on the Nazi Student Orders: Ludwig Adamovich, Matthias 
Bernegger, Friedrich Engel, Jakob Freundlich, Ernst Ganzwohl, Max Kulisch, Artur 
Lenhoff, Friedrich Mathias, Georg Pockels, and Hermann Prey.  Amts-Kalendar 1933 68. 
Jahrgang. 
 186. AUS. CONST. art. I (1929). 
 187. AUS. CONST. preamble (1934). 
 188. AUS. CONST. art. 8a (1929). 
 189. AUS. CONST. art. 3 (1934).  The double-headed eagle had been previously used as a 
symbol in the Byzantine era, see OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BYZANTIUM Vol. 1 (1991), but 
apparently without a halo. 
 190. GULICK, supra note 63, at 1429-30. 
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a) Equality 
The 1929 Constitution contained not only a broad “equality principle,” 
but also the more specific provisions imported from the Treaty of Saint-
Germain that prohibited invidious discrimination against minorities.191  All 
federal nationals were “equal before the law;” none could acquire 
privileges based on religion, sex, or class.192
The 1934 version retained these words, but twisted the “equal before the 
law” term by adding: “They may be treated unequally in the laws only so 
far as objective grounds afford justification.”
  Austrians who belonged to 
racial, religious, or other minorities must be accorded the same security in 
law and in fact as other Austrian nationals. 
193  The safeguards for 
minorities could be trumped by the card of justified inequality, a card held 
securely by the Dollfuss administration.  The drafters’ notion of 
objectively-grounded distinctions was exemplified by a provision stating 
that although hiring for government posts was “independent of religion,” 
exceptions to this principle could be created by law as to teachers.194
In a democratically-inclined society like America in the early 1950’s, the 
Austrian Saint-Germain-based 1929 Constitution could provide a superior 
model for the drafting of equal protection terminology.  Consider the more 
specific guarantees that minorities must be accorded “the same 
treatment . . . in law and in fact” as those in the majority group.  The word 
“same” becomes an additional obstacle to segregation-inclined judges and 
legislators.  The insistence on equality “in fact” defends against the 
argument that enforced segregation is permissible even where the majority 
group has most of the power.  The “in fact” reference focuses on context 
and implementation. 
  
Subordination of the constitutional “principle” to ordinary statutory 
enactments was thus secured in advance. 
In the authoritarian Austrian society of 1934, whose rulers did not see 
sovereignty as residing in the people, this rigorous draftsmanship was 
dismantled by the new Constitution’s bald statement that inequality may be 
introduced at will by “stipulation” or law.  A contemporary commentator 
noted that all the constitutional terms were “extraordinarily pliable,” 
because they could be abrogated by a simple cabinet resolution marked 
 
 191. See supra Part I.C. 
 192. AUS. CONST. art. 7 (1929). 
 193. AUS. CONST. art. 16 (1934).  Women could be denied equal rights if “the law decrees 
otherwise.”  Id. 
 194. AUS. CONST. art. 27 (1934). 
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with the right label.195
b) Association 
  The 1934 Constitution was thus casually 
announcing that despite its heavenly origin, it was not the supreme law of 
the land. 
Prior formulations of association law were not essentially altered by the 
1934 Constitution, in part because those earlier versions stemmed from an 
1867 statute heavily laced with restrictions.  Emperor Franz Joseph 
permitted this statute as an expression of largesse towards his people; they 
could form various kinds of groups providing inter alia that they registered 
with the police and received permission to continue.196  Later 
developments established a fundamental right to form associations and 
allowed mere registration to suffice as to many categories of associations, 
but the potential for supervision remained.197
This prominent aspect of Austrian law gave the Dollfuss administration 
hands-on control not only over existing organizations but over all new 
citizen groups coalescing for expressive or political purposes.
 
198
The administration fully honored that nullification ruling.  Archival 
documents show that German Student Body groups at various Austrian 
universities were being dissolved in 1933-1935, and that dissolution was 
often accompanied by a seizure of their property.
  The 1867 
law, however, did recognize one aspect of freedom—association was 
voluntary.  You had to follow rules in order to organize a group, but you 
could not be forced to join one.  This aspect was emphasized by the 
Constitutional Court when it nullified the Nazi Student Orders, finding that 
they created compulsory divisions not permitted by the relevant statutes. 
199
 
 195. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1450. 
  When the German 
 196. Reichs-Gesetz. Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1867 L VIII Stück 
134 Gesetz vom. 15 November 1867 Ueber das Vereinsrecht [November 1867 law 
concerning the right to associate] (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file 
with author). 
 197. See, e.g., ERNST MAYRHOFER, HANDBUCH FÜR DEN POLITISCHEN 
VERWALTUNGSDIENST II [MANUAL FOR POLITICAL AMINISTRATION] 97 (5th ed. 1896) 
(Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003); Adolf Merkl, JURISTISCHER BLAETTER Vol. 61, No. 
23, Dec. 17, 1932, at 1 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with 
author). 
 198. See infra note 200. 
 199. See Der Sicherheitsdirektor für das Bundesland Steiermark [Director of Security for 
the Federal Province of Styria], Ref. No. 384 De 32/2-1934, Graz. 20 Aug. 1934 (directing 
siezure of the assets of the German Student Association) (Translation Aces trans., 2001-
2003) (translation on file with author); see also PAULEY, supra note 2, at 264-65 (noting that 
Dollfuss revoked Vienna University’s academic autonomy, allowed police officers to enter 
the institution when necessary, and forbade the wearing of Nazi uniforms there). 
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Student Body in Innsbruck appealed to the Chancellor to prevent its 
demise, the reply was that compulsory organizations were impermissible 
under Austrian law.200  This bow to associational freedom fended off 
further efforts to segregate by Nations, and also produced the political 
advantage of eliminating organizations that were increasingly controlled by 
their counterparts in Nazi Germany.201
Indeed, each governmental use of the control emanating from 
associations law was skillfully designed to weaken opponents of the 
Chancellor’s top-down political apparatus.  The Government blocked the 
emergence of certain voluntary and peaceful groups while relentlessly 
“encouraging” citizens to join its own favored political organization, the 
Fatherland Front.
 
202
This pattern underlines a salient feature of associational liberty: its 
vitality is wholly dependent on equal protection and citizenship guarantees.  
By perforating the right to equal treatment, the new Constitution facilitated 
increasingly arbitrary distinctions among individuals who wished to pursue 
some common purpose through collective effort.  By establishing a 
corporative political structure, the Constitution check-mated electoral 
power to reverse that erosion of associational freedom. 
 
c) Citizenship 
The 1934 Constitution’s abolition of universal voting rights for citizens 
was radical and undisguised.203  Under the prior system, every man and 
woman over twenty had complete and equal suffrage in elections of 
representatives to the National Council of Parliament and to the state 
legislatures (diets).204
 
 200. Zu lesen: Voŕekten und Vorlagebericht I Gegenschrift des Bundeskanzleramtes [For 
Reading: Introduction and Presentation Report I, Answer by the Office of the Federal 
Chancellor] (Jan. 1934) (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with 
author). 
  These representative had protected the interests of 
 201. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 265. 
 202. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1432.  The 1934 Constitution had added a new 
provision stating that federal citizens had the right to form associations “within the limits of 
the law.”  These “limits” barred Catholic and Socialist workers from forming the kinds of 
trade unions they desired. 
  Conversely, when the government wished to promote membership in an association, 
its efforts were unstinting. After dissolution of the Socialist, Nazi, and Social Democratic 
Parties, Dollfuss had created the “Fatherland Front” as an ostensible unifying body.  Id. at 
1485.  Jobless workers filing for unemployment benefits had to fill out a form with the 
question: “What is the number of your Fatherland Front membership card?”  Id.  Taxpayers 
who were not members could face inflated claims by tax collectors.  Id. 
 203. For an account of devices used to pass this Constitution, see id. at 1404 et seq. 
 204. AUS. CONST. art. 24 (1929).  The federal government was composed of autonomous 
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widely divergent societal constituencies. 
This system was replaced by a hierarchy of appointed and designated 
councils and assemblies.  In brief, the Bundestag—a deciding legislative 
body—was composed of deputies from Councils whose members were 
appointed by the President and approved by the Chancellor, or in some 
degree dependent on the Chancellor for their positions.205  Although these 
Council deputies were drawn from various groups, including recognized 
religious or educational bodies or financial representatives from State 
government, the common thread was that they all had to be “loyal 
patriotic” citizens.206  Membership in the Fatherland Front was a minimum 
requirement in proving patriotism.  As a further safeguard against impulses 
towards independence, the Constitution deprived legislators of their prior 
immunity from criminal prosecution for statements made in legislative 
sessions.207
A chief legal spokesman for the Dollfuss regime, Dr. Robert Hecht, 
explained that one of the “advantages” of the 1934 Constitution was that 
Bundestag members would no longer have “so-called political control” 
over administration action.  Certain former legislative powers had been 
abolished, he frankly stated, because they would be “incompatible with 
authoritarian direction of the state.”
 
208
The new system also shielded the President from accountability to the 
citizenry.  He was now to be voted into office by regional officials, from a 
nomination slate of three names proposed by an assembly of the 
subservient Councils described above.
 
209  Under the old 1929 Constitution, 
Austrian citizens had elected the President by equal and direct vote.210
The government’s creation of this apparatus was motivated in part by the 
desire to suppress Austrian Nazis.
 
211  For this reason, the Viennese Jewish 
community generally trusted Dollfuss, concluding that the remaining 
alternative was not Democratic Socialism but National Socialism.212
 
states.  Id. art. 2. 
  The 
administration had destroyed all political outlets except the Fatherland 
Front, and citizens had to make the best of it.  As Sigmund Freud put it, 
“[F]rom our home-grown fascism we could put up with all sorts of things, 
 205. AUS. CONST. arts. 46-51 (1934); see GULICK, supra note 63, at 1430.  The 
Chancellor also retained emergency powers.  Id. at 1447. 
 206. Id. at 1429, 1444. 
 207. Id. at 1444. 
 208. Id. at 1446-47. 
 209. AUS. CONST. art. 73 (1934). 
 210. AUS. CONST. art. 60 (1929). 
 211. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 261. 
 212. See FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 195. 
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for it would certainly not treat us as badly as its German cousin 
would . . . .”213
Dollfuss was assassinated in July, 1934, apparently by Austrian 
Nazis,
 
214 and was succeeded by his Minister of Justice, Kurt von 
Schuschnigg.215  Like Dollfuss, Schuschnigg never made anti-Semitic 
statements, and his administration punished physical attacks on Jews in the 
universities and elsewhere.216  Yet he allowed arbitrary dismissal of Jewish 
teachers and preclusion of Jews from most government positions.217  The 
Fatherland Front segregated Jewish children in its youth organization.218
The authoritarian structure of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime 
ultimately moved the country towards segregation and Nazism, rather than 
away from them as claimed.  The incursions on citizenship established in 
the 1934 Constitution did nothing to prevent a more rapacious dictatorship 
from taking root in Austria.  Indeed, these incursions facilitated the 
subsequent public acceptance of the Hitler regime.
 
219
d) Judicial Independence 
 
An American scholar, Malbone W. Graham, Jr., noted in 1924 that “the 
doctrine of judicial supremacy is raised to a higher degree in the Austrian 
Constitution than in any other extant.”220  The Constitutional Court’s 
refusal to countenance segregation of university students had reflected this 
independence.221  That decision had a significance far greater than its 
immediate holding because it warded off the commencement of a racist 
process of destruction.  As historian Raul Hillberg has observed, “[e]ach 
step of a destructive process contains the seed of the next step.”222
Chancellor Dollfuss, however, used the new Constitution to curb the 
judiciary’s independence and to drain its authority over any aspect of his 
administration’s rapidly burgeoning program.  The former Constitutional 
Court’s merger with the Administrative Court to create a new entity was 
 
 
 213. Dieter A. Binder, The Corporate State Versus National Socialism: Some Aspects of 
Austria’s Resistance, in AUSTRIA IN THE THIRTIES, supra note 177, at 77. 
 214. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 263. 
 215. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1405. 
 216. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 260, 265, 268. 
 217. See id. at 270, 272.  But see id. at 267 indicating that a few Jews, generally Zionists, 
were appointed to high positions. 
 218. Id. at 273. 
 219. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1416. 
 220. GRAHAM, supra note 52, at 180. 
 221. The ruling itself was acceptable to the Dollfuss regime, because it underlined the 
government’s opposition to Nazi Germany.  See also supra note 213. 
 222. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 54 (1985). 
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accomplished by emergency decrees of dubious legality, which gave the 
President unencumbered power to appoint all the judges.223  As noted 
earlier, the vast majority of the former Constitutional Court’s Justices were 
not returned to the new tribunal.224  Although the 1934 Constitution did 
give this tribunal jurisdiction over the constitutionality of federal and state 
laws, another provision added that such jurisdiction did not extend to laws 
issued prior to July 1, 1934.225
As to post-1934 enactments, citizens claiming violations of civil liberties 
such as political speech could not seek review in the High Court in several 
categories of cases.  For example, someone distributing handbills deemed 
by the police to be likely to wound propriety or disturb public order could 
be convicted of an administrative offense, with no judicial review if the 
sentence was below a certain number of months.
  That manipulation neatly precluded judicial 
review of all the Dollfuss legislation that had poured out in the prior year. 
226  Such a person could 
also lose his license to do business.  A particularly ominous decree 
provided that a citizen “assumed” to be guilty of acts or omissions inimical 
to the state or cabinet could be detained indefinitely; an appeal could be 
taken to the federal Chancellor, but not to the judiciary.227
Because Austria was threatened by a powerful external enemy, drastic 
measures were necessary, Chancellor Dollfuss emphasized.  In an interview 
with a correspondent for the London Evening Standard, Dollfuss stated that 
the peril of forcible Anshluss with Germany justified his methods: “I am no 
dictator; I am a democrat . . . . My faith in the principles of the democratic 
form of government is unshaken.  But the question now is not one of 
democracy; it is one of self-preservation. . . .  [T]he choice is between 
Austria and no Austria.”
 
228  This explanation has some initial appeal.  
Austria was geographically placed between Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s 
Germany and the international community showed little interest in this 
dilemma.229
 
 223. See AUS. CONST. art. 163, art. 177(2) (1934); GULICK, supra note 63, at 1074 et seq. 
  Therefore, the administration reasoned, that they were 
compelled to authorize indefinite detention of those who would otherwise 
hand Austria over to foreign powers.  The Constitution is not a suicide 
 224. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.  
 225. See AUS. CONST. art. 170 (1934); Art. 53 of the Constitutional Law of June 19, 1934 
(which had the same status as provisions appearing in the Constitution itself); GULICK, 
supra note 63, at 1421; supra note 93. 
 226. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1466. 
 227. Id. at 1468.  This was of particular concern with respect to unsupported anonymous 
accusations.  Id. at 1469. 
 228. Id. at 1077; see also PAULEY, supra note 2, at 261.  But cf. Binder, supra note 213, at 
71 (discussing German terrorist activities in Austria). 
 229. GULICK, supra note 63, at 1857. 
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pact.230
That justification loses plausibility because the government was 
unwilling to subject its detention decrees and other repressive measures to 
judicial review.  There was no High Court with the authority to distinguish 
between criminals and innocent citizens and to bar anonymous charges.  
The paradigm example of the regime’s own unwillingness to make such 
distinctions is the case of Karl Leuthner. 
 
Leuthner was the anti-Nazi debater who had so eloquently opposed the 
prior administration’s attempt to launch a segregation bill in Parliament.231  
In 1934, he was arrested and interned for six months.232  As one 
commentator concluded, the internment of “this patently unrevolutionary 
anti-Marxist and errant outsider . . . can only be interpreted as a precaution 
acknowledging Leuthner’s substantial popular following.”233  After his 
release, Leuthner never again made a public statement, and died in 1944.234
In July 1936, Schuschnigg made an agreement with Hitler to legalize the 
Austrian Nazi Party and permit Nazi rallies in exchange for Germany’s 
promise to recognize Austria’s independence.
 
235
Hitler did not keep his pledge to preserve Austria’s independence.  His 
plan to take over Austria had been organized even before he became 
Germany’s Chancellor in 1933,
  The Dollfuss-
Schuschnigg administration’s attempt to suppress independence in its 
judiciary and citizenry was more successful than its abandoned attempt to 
suppress local Nazi activists. 
236 and had been implemented step-by-step 
with the aid of collaborators.237
 
  The danger of such a takeover had exerted 
an increasing threat to the independence of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court and its successor.  By contrast, no external peril hampered the United 
States Supreme Court as it undertook the disavowal of Plessy. 
 
 230. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 
500, 509 (1964); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
 231. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 232. Roger Fletcher, Socialist Nationalism in Central Europe Before 1914: The Case Of 
Karl Leuthner, 17 CANADIAN J. HIST. 30 (1982). 
 233. Id. at 43. 
 234. Id. at 30. 
 235. DEBORAH DWORK & ROBERT JAN VAN PELT, HOLOCAUST:  A HISTORY 94 (2002). 
 236. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 120 (1960). 
 237. See infra note 235. 
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H. Anschluss and Enforced Segregation 
Germany’s 1935 racist Nuremberg decrees238
The first main goal of the German measures must be strict segregation of 
Jewry from the rest of the population. . . .  Then immediately, the wearing 
of the recognition sign consisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought 
about and all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. . . .  Any 
cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the Jew.  This includes 
the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish theatres, and schools.
 were accompanied by the 
following order: 
239
Hitler’s Anschluss with Austria succeeded in March 1938, and brought 
with it these segregation goals.
 
240  Chancellor Schuschnigg’s oppositional 
efforts were fatally undermined by his continuing failure to cooperate with 
democratic elements which might have been his natural allies,241 and by 
international indifference to Austria’s isolation.242  Minutes after 
Schuschnigg announced his resignation, local Nazis took control.243
1.  The Disappearance of Diversity 
  Here 
began the precipitous fall that had been held off for seven years by the 
Constitutional Court’s refusal to permit the first step––enforced separation 
of university students. 
The effect of Nazi racism on universities was devastating.  At the 
University of Vienna, 50% of the Law School faculty was fired for having 
the wrong religion or the wrong opinions, as was 66% of the philosophy 
faculty and more than 50% of the medical faculty.244
 
 238. These decrees were issued on September 15, 1935.  See description in the Avalon 
Project: Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 2., Second Day, at 27, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-21-45.htm. 
  Sigmund and Anna 
 239. Id. 
 240. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 275. 
 241. Binder, supra note 213, at 76-77; GULICK, supra note 63, at 1858. 
 242. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1857. 
 243. Id. at 1847-48.  Schuschnigg had hoped that holding a plebiscite on March 13, 1938 
deciding whether Austria should remain independent of Germany, would result in a vote 
against Anschluss.  PAULEY, supra note 2, at 279.  Hitler’s troops arrived, however, on 
March 12, 1938.  Id.  In his resignation speech, Schuschnigg stated that Hitler’s claims that 
German assistance was needed to quell disorder in Austrian streets were “fabrications from 
A to Z.”  GULICK, supra note 63, at 1846-47.  His speech concluded with “a heart-felt wish: 
God protect Austria.”  Id. 
 244. BRIGITTE LICHTENBERGER-FENZ, UNIVERSITAETEN 1938- AUSSCJ;ISS UND 
VERFOLGUNG OESTERREICHISCHER WISSENSCHAFTLERRINEN IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS [THE 
UNIVERSITIES IN 1938: THE EXCLUSION AND PERSECUTION OF AUSTRIAN ACADEMICS UNDER 
NATIONAL SOCIALISM] 6 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with 
author) [hereinafter FENZ II].  Professors were required to swear allegiance to Hitler.  Id. at 
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Freud fled, Nobel prize winners were banished, and entire branches of 
scientific inquiry disappeared.245  The diversity of thought that had 
enriched the University and brought international acclaim was 
impoverished.246
Three key figures in the invalidation of the Nazi Student Orders were 
affected by the Anschluss in strikingly different ways.  Justice Arthur 
Lenhoff of the Constitutional Court, who had persistently argued that the 
Student Orders were unconstitutional under the equality principle, escaped 
from Austria in 1938 and emigrated to America where he became a law 
professor, practitioner, and author of two casebooks and numerous law 
review articles.
 
247  Constitutional Court Justice Ludwig Adamovich was 
forced to retire from public life in 1938, but after the war became President 
of the Austrian Constitutional Court when it was revived by the Allies.248  
Joseph Hupka, a Dean of Vienna Law School who had taken the lead in 
challenging the Student Orders in the public press,249 was arrested by the 
Nazis in 1938 and sent to Theresienstadt concentration camp where he 
perished.250
2.  The Success of Segregation 
 
Hitler had expressed impatience with the Christian Socials for 
 
4.  The only discipline at the University of Vienna that was untouched by the purge was 
history.  See David F. Crew, Book Review, [WILLFÄHRIGE WISSENSCHAFT: DIE 
UNIVERSITAET WIEN, 1938-45, OESTERREICHISCHE TEXTE ZUR GESELLSCHAFTSKRITIK], Vol. 
43 (Gernot Heiss et al. eds., 1989). 
 245. FENZ II, supra note 244, at 7. 
 246. In contemporary America, establishing a diverse faculty still remains problematic.  
African-Americans comprise only 3% of the faculty in predominantly white institutions and 
5% of faculty nationwide.  Ryan Heffernan, Faculty Diversity Still Tops Priority List, 
HEIGHTS, at http://www.bcheights.com/news/2003/02/04/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2004); Cathy 
A. Trower & Richard P. Chait, Faculty Diversity: Too Little For Too Long, HARV. MAG., at 
http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line.030218.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004). 
 247. Saul Touster, Arthur Lenhoff, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 1965 Proceedings Pt. 1-10, 
at 143-46.  In 1963, the Austrian government gave former Justice Lenhoff an award for 
distinguished intellectual endeavors.  Id. at 145. 
 248. ISABELLA ACKERL & FRIEDRICH WEISSENSTEINER, OESTERREICHISCHES PERSONEN 
LEXIKON 8 (1992). 
 249. See Dr. Joseph Hupka, Die Studenten Ordnung der Universität Wien [The Student 
Regulations of the University of Vienna], NEUE FREIE PRESSE (Vienna) Apr. 23, 1930, at 1.  
Dr. Hupka, after parsing the disingenuous language of the regulations, concluded that very 
few if any law professors or jurists believed that these regulations were properly grounded 
in law. 
 250. See Juridische Fakultät und Rechtsstudium an der Universität Wien 1365-1997, Ein 
Überblick von Ilse Reiter, VII. 1938-1945 [Law Faculty and Law Study at the University of 
Vienna, 1365-1997, An Overview by Ilsa Reiter, VII, 1938-1945], available at 
http://www.juridicum.at/studium/fakg_08.htm. 
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predicating anti-Semitism on religion, rather than on understanding that 
“Jews are not in any ultimate sense a religious community but a race.”251  
The Nuremberg laws defined a “full blooded” Jew as anyone who practiced 
the religion (which increased the taint) and had two Jewish grandparents, or 
someone who did not and had at least three Jewish grandparents.252
Implementation of segregation based on these Nazi theories was far 
swifter in Austria than it had been in Germany.
 
253  Within a month of the 
Nazi takeover, the 16,000 Jewish youngsters in Viennese primary and 
secondary schools were put in separate classes, then later transferred to 
eight all-Jewish schools, and by the following year barred from public 
schools altogether.254  Jewish students were eventually excluded from 
universities.255  By January 1939, Jews could not enter public parks, sports 
stadiums, or sleeping and dining cars on trains.256  Landlords could 
terminate any lease made with a Jewish tenant.257  Jewish doctors and 
lawyers were forbidden to treat Gentile patients and clients.258  A stream of 
such legislation––250 different edicts––added a grotesque veneer of 
legality to these measures.259
II. 
  The “first” goal of the Nuremberg decrees 
had been achieved. 
United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black noted at a court 
conference on the Brown case that Hitler’s creed of segregation and racial 
inferiority did not seem to differ markedly from the views of White 
Southerners about the necessity of keeping the races apart.260
 
 251. Kurt Rudolf Fisher, The Death of “Austrian Philosophy,” in AUSTRIA IN THE 
THIRTIES, supra note 177, at 302-03. 
  This point 
had also occurred to many Black Americans, who saw the World War II 
fascist enemy abroad in somewhat the same light as the Southern enemy at 
 252. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 208. 
 253. Id. at 286. 
 254. Id. at 290. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. HILBERG, supra note 222, at 171.  A lease could be terminated upon a showing by 
the landlord that the tenant could live somewhere else.  Id.  Simultaneously, Jews who still 
maintained their apartments were compelled to accept homeless Jewish families as tenants.  
Id.  At this time Austria had been absorbed into Germany and was governed by its decrees.  
PAULEY, supra note 2, at 230. 
 258. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 290. 
 259. Id. 
 260. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 142 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, 
and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 24-25 (1994). 
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home.261  Professor Fredrickson observes, however, that a systematic 
comparison between White supremacy in the southern United States and 
Nazi Germany’s treatment of Jews must be made, and suggests parallels.262
I will explore below the similarities between Austrian and American 
segregationist regimes as to the mystiques they invoked and the 
prohibitions they developed, and will also identify substantial differences 
in context.  This comparison will focus on the judiciary’s uncomfortable 
role in disestablishing school segregation.  The rule of law in Austria was 
both the product of a traditional culture and at war with prevailing power 
differentials.  The Brown and McLaurin decisions and their aftermath pitted 
national law against deeply engrained Southern practices.  These conflicts 
provide lessons forward as to current debates on issues of equality, 
association, and citizenship. 
 
A.   The Minority’s Taint and the Majority’s Resultant Right to 
Segregate 
Racism reflects a mind-set that views the out-group as different from the 
in-group in ways that are so crucial and unchangeable that the two groups 
cannot coexist, except perhaps on the basis of domination and 
subjugation.263
1.  The Myth of Blood 
  Austrian Nazis and Southern segregationists proclaimed 
that unless their regimes were protected by whatever measures were 
necessary, contamination would overwhelm traditional society. 
Although the Nazis and the designers of the Jim Crow laws transformed 
inequality into an official ideology, rationalizations for twentieth century 
racism predated these bureaucratized regimes.  To cite a few examples, 
many Europeans in medieval times conceived of Jews as accomplices of 
Satan.264  Wilhelm Marr, who founded the Anti-Semitic League in 
Germany, warned in an 1879 book that Jews were tainted by nature rather 
than merely having the wrong religious views.265
 
 261. NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 6-10 (1976). 
  In America, nineteenth 
century pro-slavery advocates who wished to avoid clashing with the 
evangelical Christian belief that all people descend from Adam, asserted 
that God had cursed the supposedly Black descendants of Noah’s son Ham 
 262. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 99. 
 263. Id. at 9. 
 264. Id. at 21-22. 
 265. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 28-29. 
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and condemned them to be “servants unto servants.”266  And in a debate on 
an 1875 civil rights bill in Congress, John Harris of Virginia stated that 
“[t]here is not one gentleman upon this floor who can honestly say he really 
believes that the colored man is created his equal.”267
Twentieth-century racists carried forward these views.  An Austrian 
Nazi attempting to push through the 1932 segregation bill in Parliament 
noted: “We can distinguish between a German-blooded man and a Jew.”
 
268  
Arguing in opposition, Karl Leuthner rejected the “myth of blood” which 
would decree that someone could be German-Austrian in language and 
culture with generations of Catholic ancestors, but if one grandmother has 
“just a smidgeon of Jewish blood, this Jewish blood is stronger than the 
baptism of centuries . . . .”269  As to the smidgeon of Negro blood sufficient 
to “taint” in the Jim Crow American South, Charles S. Mangum, Jr.’s 
account of the 1940’s listed states that defined a person of color as one with 
any ascertainable trace of Black blood or any Black blood, although there 
were other variations using blood percentages.270  The question of who was 
Black was defined by Whites, and the pejorative nature of that definition 
was demonstrated by the fact that “Every court which has considered the 
question has held that writing that a white man is a Negro is libelous per 
se.”271
Because the dominant (pure) group could be contaminated by sexual 
contact, Nazis and southern segregationists were particularly obsessed 
about “race mixing” and enacted miscegenation laws to punish it.
 
272  Hitler 
accused both Jews and Blacks of attempting to ruin the White (read, Aryan) 
race by “bastardization” that would throw Whites down from their “cultural 
and political height.”273
2.   The Myth of the Majority’s Moral Superiority 
 
Loss of political height is a casualty of war rather than intermarriage, 
 
 266. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 79-80. 
 267. 2 Cong. Rec. 376 (Jan. 5, 1874) (colloquy between Rep. Harris and Rep. Ransier). 
 268. Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2090. 
 269. Id. at 2071. 
 270. CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 5-10 (1940); cf. Daniel 
Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473, 1476-77 
(2003) (concluding that there was greater flexibility than has been previously assumed). 
 271. MANGUM, supra note 270, at 18. 
 272. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 172; see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) 
(declaring miscegenation laws to be unconstitutional).  Nicholas D. Kristof notes that there 
is about ten times more genetic difference within a race than between races.  Nicholas D. 
Kristof, Love and Race, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at A35. 
 273. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 119-120. 
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and fuels humiliation that may be assuaged by subordinating some internal 
“enemy.”  The subordination process requires stigmatizing this enemy and 
elevating the in-group.  The Treaty of Saint-Germain, binding on Austria 
after her defeat in World War I, was more severe than the Treaty of 
Versailles that bound Germany.274  Austria was forced to cede most of her 
former imperial territory and was precluded from joining the new German 
republic.  Many kinds of Jews––“revolutionaries,” bankers, refugees from 
the former eastern provinces––were conveniently blamed for this defeat 
and the inflation that followed.275  These alleged miscreants were 
contrasted to the true German-Austrian people “filled with the life force,” 
idealistic, pious, poetic, honorable.276
In the American Civil War, White Southerners not only experienced a 
high casualty rate but also lost their chance for an independent Confederacy 
and much of their prior economic viability.  They resented the African-
Americans who joined the Union Army, and those who later voted 
Republican in the Reconstruction era dominated by northern 
“Carpetbaggers.”
 
277  The insolvency of some Republican-dominated state 
governments in which Blacks held official posts were cited as examples of 
the corruption of such bi-racial bodies.278  Descriptions of the “war 
between the states” and Reconstruction were refurbished for the benefit of 
the next generation as though the events had just occurred and could 
provide a lens for viewing the present.279  The Ku Klux Klan was 
romantically presented, while Blacks were accused of arrogance, 
impertinence, criminality, and incompetence.280
Those invoking the vanquished beauty of the “Old South,” who would 
have found it abhorrent to use kidnapped people as perpetual unpaid labor 
if the laborers had been White, were comfortable with the former tradition 
of owning African-American slaves.  The lost Confederacy they envisioned 
was a serene, well-ordered society of gentlemen, a democratic White polity 
whose institutions were approved by the law, the church, and the press.
 
281
 
 274. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 79.  Austria lost areas inhabited by 3.5 million German-
speaking Austrians.  Id. 
 
 275. Id. at 80, 318. 
 276. Id. at 5; see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 277. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 106; WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 85. 
 278. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 85. 
 279. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 85-86. 
 280. Id. at 76, 86. 
 281. Id. at 5. 
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3.   The Downward Trajectory to Segregation 
In the twelve years after the Treaty of Saint Germain had set out the 
terms for Austria’s new incarnation as a Republic, rage over these terms 
increased.  Polemicists claimed that Austria was saddled with a 
Constitution that specifically protected the very minority whose 
machinations were controlling the country.282  The University of Vienna 
must guard the German Student Body from pollution by officially 
segregating it from Jewish students.  Frustration of this purpose would 
signal a final defeat for the majority group.  The German-Austrian Daily 
News demanded: “Are we Germans still the decision-making masters in 
our own country, or are we now nothing more than tolerated guests, fair 
game for a handful of foreigners . . ..?”283
In a similar span of years after the Confederacy’s surrender to Union 
forces, White supremacists complained that they were oppressed by 
“Yankee and Negro rule.”
 
284  Yet, observers from both races described 
“freedom of association between whites and blacks . . . frequency and 
intimacy of personal contact, and . . . Negro participation in political 
affairs” in various parts of the South, as well as rising fury culminating in 
lynching and fanatical assertions of racism.285  Professor Vann Woodward 
reminded us that at this point, “There were real choices to be made, and 
alternatives to the course eventually pursued with such single-minded 
unanimity and unquestioning conformity were still available.”286
These two post-war periods in Austria and the American South indicate 
some intriguing parallels in the majority group’s sense that defeat had 
opened the door for outsiders to change the rules of the game.  As a result 
of this humiliating interference, the majority was now under siege by the 
“Other” and must act politically to terminate that threat.  A difference, 
which will be discussed further below, was the judiciary’s response.  In 
Austria the Constitutional Court’s rescission of the Nazi Student Orders 
postponed the onset of segregation for years, while in America the High 
Court’s choice was to join the changing national mood elevating federalism 
over minority rights.  Federal troops departed from the South in 1877, and 
the North (whose own record on race relations was hardly sterling) tilted 
towards sectional reconciliation.
 
287
 
 282. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 79-80. 
 
 283. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 284. WILLIAM J. COOPER, JR., JEFFERSON DAVIS, AMERICAN 602 (2000). 
 285. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 35-44. 
 286. Id. at 44. 
 287. Id. at 6, 70-71. 
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The United States Supreme Court had curtailed the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in the Slaughter House Cases288 and its successors,289 
and then held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress 
to bar individuals from engaging in discriminatory conduct;290 determined 
that a state could mandate segregation on a common carrier;291 concluded 
in Plessy v. Ferguson that segregation was constitutional if based on a 
“separate but equal” system;292 and validated Mississippi’s plan for 
depriving Blacks of the right to vote.293
Segregation laws freed of judicial restriction began to proliferate in the 
twentieth century, embodied in local regulations, city ordinances, and 
statutes.
 
294  In various patterns that appeared, Blacks were separated from 
Whites in employment, in theaters and movie houses, street cars, trains, 
buses, parks, and schools.295  Residence for Blacks could be restricted to 
certain areas by law, by threats, or by economics.296  In some cities, 
curfews forbade them to go out after 10 p.m.297  Mobs robbed, assaulted, 
and murdered them.298
The Jim Crow laws put the authority of the state or city in the voice of the 
street-car conductor, the railway brakeman, the bus driver, the theater 
usher, and also into the voice of the hoodlum . . . .  They gave free rein 
and the majesty of the law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have 
been curbed, blunted or deflected.
  In the words of Professor Woodward, 
299
And so it was also in Austria.  After the Anschluss, segregation of Jews 
in employment and provision of professional services was put into place;
 
300 
residential separation was facilitated by confiscating homes and 
terminating leases, forcing Jews into a few areas where large numbers lived 
in a few rooms.301
 
 288. See generally 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
  Jews were segregated and ultimately excluded from 
schools, parks, movie theaters, sports stadiums, barber shops, and train 
 289. See generally United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542 (1875). 
 290. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 291. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890). 
 292. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 293. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898). 
 294. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 98-99, 106. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 100-01. 
 297. Id. at 101. 
 298. Id. at 86-87. 
 299. Id. at 107-08. 
 300. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 282-83, 285-86, 290. 
 301. Id. at 288-89. 
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cars.302  Curfews were imposed.303  Bands of roving thugs, often joined by 
the SA, looted, tortured, and murdered Jews, especially in Vienna.304  By 
1941, any possibility of anonymity was removed; although Jews could not 
generally be identified by skin color, any Jew over the age of six had to 
wear the clearly visible Star of David.305
4. Significant Differences in Context Between Austrian and Southern 
Domination 
 
Before comparison of the Austrian Constitutional Court’s decision with 
the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Brown and its predecessors, 
some distinctions in political context must be set out.  These distinctions 
are important and intertwined with each other. 
Under the Habsburg Monarchy, Austrian Jews had generally enjoyed 
constitutional equality, respect, and protection that enabled them to interact 
with modern society and to make substantial contributions to Austrian 
culture.306  This golden age was ended when the murder of the heir to the 
Austro-Hungarian throne in 1914 led to four years of war and economic 
disaster that fueled an upsurge of Austrian anti-Semitism.307  In the next 
two decades, poorer Jews––who were probably the bulk of the Austrian 
Jewish population––worked as tailors, peddlers, and newspaper salesmen.  
Many were immigrants from the former eastern provinces of the Empire, 
and were described in pan-German propaganda as foreign parasites.308
Competition between Jews and Christians tended to occur at the next 
level, that of middle-class merchants and professionals.
 
309  Jews had 
difficulty finding jobs with Gentile employers, and gravitated towards 
starting their own businesses, or joining professions such as architecture, 
law, and medicine.310  If they were successful, they were often accused of 
rising through unfair use of influence rather than through merit.311
When Nazi power increased, it was popular and profitable to eliminate 
these unneeded competitors.  Although Jewish businesses employed 
Christians, the entire enterprise could simply be “Aryanized” and the 
 
 
 302. Id. at 284, 291. 
 303. Id. at 291. 
 304. Id. at 287. 
 305. Id. at 291. 
 306. Id. at 11, 22-23. 
 307. Id. at 60. 
 308. Id. at 80, 178, 212, 216. 
 309. Id. at 200-02. 
 310. Id. at 213. 
 311. See supra Part I.F.2. 
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owners given a token payment or none at all.312  In 1938, all Jewish actors, 
musicians, journalists, and employees of banks and insurance companies 
were dismissed.313
By contrast, Blacks emerging from slavery in America were competing 
largely with lower-income Whites.
 
314  Employers used African-Americans 
as strike-breakers, service workers, and servants.315  Landowners used 
them as share-croppers.316  They were cheap labor, and necessary to the 
viability of the South.  Suffering from the lingering effects of slave status 
in their speech and manner, they were derided as innately inferior and 
therefore unfit for full participation in White civilization.317
These differences in the strata of job competition are relevant to the most 
stark distinction between Austrian Nazi and Jim Crow domination.  In 
Austria, the “final solution” that followed segregation was to drive out, 
intern, and ultimately kill the minority group.
 
318  Emigration after 
surrendering every asset was legally permitted until 1941, yet even before 
that time transports to work and death camps had begun.  In the American 
South, the “final settlement” in the early Twentieth Century was 
segregation, accompanied by lynching and threats to those who did not 
“stay ‘in their place.’”319
B. Brown and Judicial Choices 
  Neither of these outcomes could ever have 
occurred without prior demonization of the other as a bearer of pollution 
that could destroy a beautified traditional society.  The economic element 
must be recognized, however.  Austria’s Nazis were enriched by expulsion 
of Jews, the South’s Whites by expulsion of “Carpetbaggers” and 
establishment of a new kind of servitude for Blacks. 
Proponents of “separate but equal” in Austria and America favored 
similar tests relying on formula instead of fact.  The University of Vienna’s 
Academic Senate proclaimed that its Student Nations each had “the same 
rights.”  The German Student Body had the right to exclude those it 
categorized as Jewish; presumably, the Jewish Student Body could reject 
 
 312. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 283. 
 313. Id. at 282-83. 
 314. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 86. 
 315. Id. at 86-87. 
 316. Id. at 93. 
 317. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 32, 76. 
 318. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 294-98. 
 319. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 93.  Note also that for Jews, the greatest period of 
oppression came after segregation, while the greatest oppression for Blacks––slavery––
occurred before Jim Crow; WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 7. 
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any Gentile who applied.  Each group could elect a representative.  Thus, 
mandatory separation did not constitute inequality.  That brand of logic 
surfaced in the United States Supreme Court’s Plessy v. Ferguson320
When this equal-exclusion claim was considered in the context of higher 
education, the Court balked.  Petitioner in Sweatt v. Painter
 
decision upholding Louisiana’s authority to segregate railway carriages and 
noting that no race was more disadvantaged than the other.  Blacks were 
excluded from “White” railway cars and Whites from “Black” cars. 
321 was denied 
admission to the state-supported University of Texas Law School because 
he was Black, but was given the “opportunity” (which he rejected) to enroll 
in a separate law school that had just been created by the State for Blacks.  
The unanimous bench assessed not only the tangible qualities of the two 
schools (the newer one was somewhat upgraded after the trial stage in the 
lawsuit), but also the intangible qualities: “It may be argued that excluding 
petitioner from . . . [Texas Law School] is no different from excluding 
white students from the new law school.  This contention overlooks 
realities.”322  It would be highly unlikely that a majority group member 
attending a school with “rich traditions and prestige” would complain that 
he was deprived of the chance to enroll at the Black school.323
Moving to a situation of intra-school segregation that presents some 
parallels to the Nazi Student Orders at the University of Vienna, appellant 
in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education
  Applying 
these realities to Austria’s segregated student groups, “equal rights” could 
not be demonstrated merely by providing each student with a ticket to some 
entity labeled a Nation. 
324
 
 320. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).  “Separate but equal” was perceived as a tangible 
deprivation by Black students who were subjected to it.  In one case, a seven-year-old third 
grader, who lived only a few blocks from the local Whites-only school, had to walk six 
blocks through dangerous railroad switching yards, then cross the area’s busiest commercial 
street to reach a school bus pick-up point to get to  an all-Black school.  If the school was 
not yet open when the bus arrived, she waited in all weathers.  The area was Topeka, 
Kansas, and the child was Linda Brown, the oldest of the five Brown plaintiffs.  KLUGER, 
supra note 56, at 409-10.  For detailed descriptions of disparities in facilities, see id. at 13-
14, 302, 388-89. 
 was a 
Black student with a Master’s Degree in Education who applied to 
Oklahoma University in order to study for a doctorate.  He was denied 
 321. 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950). 
 322. Id. at 634. 
 323. Id.  Petitioner’s right to attend Texas Law School was upheld, though his request 
that Plessy be re-examined was not.  Id. at 634-36. 
 324. 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950).  The case was argued by Robert L. Carter and Amos T. 
Hall, counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(“NAACP”).  Id. at 637. 
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admission because of his race, then (after filing a federal suit) admitted but 
compelled to sit in an anteroom adjoining the classroom, use only a 
designated mezzanine desk in the library, and eat only at a different time 
from other students in the cafeteria.325  As the case progressed to the 
Supreme Court, these conditions were altered to the extent that McLaurin 
now sat in the regular classroom but in a separate designated row, and ate 
at the same time in the cafeteria as White students but at an assigned 
separate table.  The University argued that these were nominal restrictions, 
and that he was permitted to wait in the same cafeteria line and talk with 
Whites as he did so.326
These opportunities for in-line chats did not impress the Supreme Court.  
Setting McLaurin apart from majority-group students would “impair and 
inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views” 
with classmates.
 
327  Perhaps removal of legal restrictions would still not 
induce these classmates to talk to him.  Nevertheless “[t]here is a vast 
difference – a Constitutional difference – between restrictions imposed by 
the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, and the 
refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no such 
bar.”328
We do not have evidence about whether the Student Nations in Austria 
were compelled to sit apart in lunchrooms.  The impact of the mandated 
separation was on the exercise of intra-school political rights.  Jewish 
students excluded from the German Student Body were thereby also 
excluded from assisting in “discipline” and keeping order; voting in critical 
student elections; using special faculty spaces for meetings; helping to set 
policy on such issues as ceilings on the number of Jews to be admitted to 
the University.
 
329
The United States Supreme Court finally grappled with the issue of 
  These disabilities would affect opportunities for the 
“intellectual commingling” that was at the center of McLaurin’s concerns.  
Members of the German Student Body did not consider their individual 
power to impose social ostracism to be nearly sufficient; the segregation 
had to be State-imposed in order to consolidate their political goals.  One of 
these was the need to stigmatize. 
 
 325. Id. at 638-40. 
 326. Id. at 640-41. 
 327. Id. at 641. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.  Assistance with “discipline” would allow members of 
the German Student Body to punish those who were charged with disobeying rules (or to 
refrain from doing so); GULICK, supra note 63, at 639-41. 
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stigma in Brown,330 using it as one of the predicates for the holding that 
“separate but equal” is unconstitutional in the field of public education.  
Cases coming from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Delaware were consolidated because the plaintiffs in each had been 
excluded from schools attended by White children under laws requiring or 
permitting racial segregation.331  The arguments on behalf of the plaintiffs 
were presented by National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”) counsel, pursuant to an evolving strategy described in 
riveting detail by historian Richard Kluger.332  The Brown opinion 
underscored its theme by citing with approval a pre-Plessy statement in 
Strauder v. West Virginia, a case involving an attempt to preclude Blacks 
from serving on juries: “[Due process of law includes] the right to 
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as 
colored, . . . implying inferiority in civil society, . . . which are steps toward 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.”333
This quote stressed the discriminatory purpose of the legislation, an 
approach that is highly relevant to the Nazi Student Orders.  The Orders 
were designed to be the first step in legalizing all forms of segregation in 
Austria.  Brown’s principal emphasis, however, was not on legislative 
intent but instead on the impact of segregation, which deprived minority-
group children in public schools of equal educational opportunity.  
Rejecting Plessy’s assertion that mandatory separation of the races was 
only offensive if Blacks decided to interpret it that way, the Justices 
concluded that segregating Black children in elementary and high schools 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community” that 
is unlikely to be reversed.
 
334  The social science data underlying this 
finding were picked apart from many political perspectives in subsequent 
years.335
 
 330. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  The difficulty of making such judicial choices can be seen in the 
 331. Id. at 486. 
 332. KLUGER, supra note 56, at 509-81.  Robert L. Carter argued for plaintiffs in the 
Brown case from Kansas; Thurgood Marshall represented plaintiffs in the companion case, 
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), from South Carolina.  An associate of 
the two advocates described Carter as “the keel” and Marshall as “the wind.”  KLUGER, 
supra note 56, at 272. 
 333. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 n.5 (quoting approvingly from Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880)). 
 334. Id. at 494. 
 335. See, e.g., CHARLES OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
FIRST FALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 302 (2004).  Professor Ogletree 
notes: 
The challenge of Brown was not only to achieve integration but also to recognize 
that once integrated, all of us are diverse: we have all given up something to gain 
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painful deliberations and “unanimous” opinions of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court and the United  States Supreme Court.  Some issues 
were ignored and others bolstered, while the Justices kept a close eye on 
public opinion and calculated the costs of each stand they took. 
1. Judicial Independence 
a) The Constitutional Court and External Pressures 
In response to the Austrian Constitutional Court’s nullification of 
University segregation, the pan-German press proclaimed that “courts . . . 
are not independent arbitrary plantations, self-sufficient and detached from 
the people, who can simply turn their eyes away from the people and the 
government who appoint them, can simply ignore their mission and 
implement traitorous policies, and an ‘administration of justice’ that are 
inimical to the people.”336
Rather than returning the case to the court below, the Justices had 
undertaken the responsibility and used the Associations Law as a predicate 
for rescission of the Nazi Student Orders.  That left no controversy about 
remedy; the German Student Body no longer had the imprimatur of law to 
continue in existence.  It was foreseeable that this choice would result in an 
escalation of violence––pressure that the Justices did not acknowledge, 
 
 
something more.  Integration does not simply place people side by side in various 
institutional settings; rather, it remakes America, creating a new community 
founded on a new form of respect and tolerance.  Implicit in that challenge was 
the recognition that white society had to change to acknowledge in substantive 
ways the achievements of African-American society.  It was not enough simply to 
admit African-Americans to the table, or even to let them dine, but to partake of 
the food they brought with them. 
Id. at 295; see generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF 
INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004); 
PETER IRONS, JIM CROW’S CHILDREN, THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 
(2002); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE 
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001); Joseph D. Silbey, Race Judicata, SOC. SCI. RES. 
NETWORK ELECTRONIC LIBR., available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=531283. 
  The question of whether bias would affect any group that was its object was pursued 
by counsel for defendants in one of the consolidated Brown cases emanating from Virginia.  
Dr. Isador Chein, a Jewish expert witness for plaintiffs who was bluntly asked whether 
discrimination made him feel inferior, explained that when the government of a state or 
country endorses the inferiority of a group on the basis of skin color or religion, its members 
tend to internalize that view.  KLUGER, supra note 56, at 494. 
 336. See supra note 9.  The article noted that such dangerous illusions of independence 
must be dispelled, by “brutality” if necessary. 
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even in their deliberations.  Nazi electoral victories in Germany posed an 
increasing external threat to Austria’s independence, and strengthened the 
determination of Austrian Nazis to achieve their segregationist goals by 
terrorizing their opponents.  The Constitutional Court’s action prevented 
the fruition of these goals until the Anschluss. 
b)  The Supreme Court and Regional Resistance 
The American Justices were less restrained in expressing their fear that 
defiance and violence would follow a desegregation decree.  Professor 
Mark Tushnet, Richard Kluger, and other historians have provided insights 
into the Brown I deliberations and the subsequent conferences about 
remedy in Brown II.  Like Court President Durig in Vienna, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren had a crucial impact on the Supreme Court’s direction.  He did 
not make accusations against Southern segregationists which would have 
antagonized two of his colleagues, but instead commented only that 
“segregation was no longer justifiable in this day and age.”337
Justice Frankfurter, an apostle of judicial restraint but nonetheless 
committed to overruling Plessy, reminded the Justices of the political 
implications of failing to do so.
 
338  The administration of President Harry 
S. Truman had opposed the caste system, and had already urged the 
Justices in 1950, in the prior Henderson case, to overrule the “separate but 
equal” doctrine.339
President Truman had taken a number of prior steps to implement racial 
justice.  In 1946, he established a Commission on Higher Education, which 
concluded that segregation legislation must be repealed.
  In addition, there were international repercussions.  The 
Department of Justice’s amicus brief in the restrictive covenant cases had 
stated that racial segregation hampered the United States in foreign 
relations, especially in competition with the Soviet Union for the favor of 
African nations. 
340  Integration of 
American troops pursuant to Truman’s executive order of July 26, 1948, 
was eventually implemented, governing soldiers serving abroad in Austria 
and Germany and at home in army, navy, and air force bases in Georgia, 
the Carolinas, Virginia, Alabama, and Texas.341
Although the executive branch had advocated desegregation, the impact 
 
 
 337. See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened In Brown v. Board of 
Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1877 (1991) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER 
CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT ––A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 95 (1985)). 
 338. Id. at 1908-09. 
 339. Id. at 1885-87. 
 340. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 135. 
 341. Id. at 137-39. 
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of such a decree on southern sensibilities troubled some of the Justices.  
Professor Tushnet described a draft opinion by Jackson stating that the 
Court could not discount the claims of Whites who sincerely believed that 
“their blood, lineage and culture are worthy of protection by enforced 
separatism of races.”342  Their feelings had been reinforced by the 
humiliation of “carpetbag government imposed by conquest” and 
resentment of the Reconstruction.343  Justice Black predicted that 
overruling Plessy would engender resistance and violence.  Nonetheless, 
because segregation established an unconstitutional caste system, the Court 
must strike it down knowing that this “means trouble.”344
And trouble came.  Four states displayed open resistance by imposing 
penalties for compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision.
 
345  There was 
violence even at the university level, where the Justices had expected less 
difficulty because the numbers of African-Americans admitted would be 
smaller.346  A riot broke out at the University of Alabama over the 
admission of Autherine Lucy, and mobs threatened her as she attended 
classes.347  In Mississippi, Governor Ross Barnett announced that 
integration was unconstitutional, and that any federal officials seeking to 
implement it would be arrested.348  Three hundred and twenty federal 
marshals entered the University of Mississippi at Oxford in 1962 to protect 
James Meredith, an African-American native of the state whose admission 
to the school had been ordered by Justice Black.349  The marshals were 
dispatched by President John F. Kennedy, who had from the start of his 
administration proclaimed that Brown was “legally and morally right.”350  
His televised appeal for reason, urging that “the honor of your university 
and the state are in the balance” was unavailing.351
 
 342. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 337, at 1915. 
  Armed mobs attacked 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 1904-05. 
 345. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 157. 
 346. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 337, at 1903. 
 347. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 163.  Autherine Lucy was suspended, reinstated by 
court order, and then immediately expelled for making “outrageous” charges against the 
University trustees.  The University of Alabama remained segregated for seven more years.  
Id.  President Dwight D. Eisenhower took no action in this instance.  Id.  But the President 
subsequently sent federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to protect nine Black children who 
had been prevented from entering an all-White high school by Governor Orval E. Faubus’s 
national guard and threatened by huge mobs.  Id. at 166. 
 348. Id. at 174. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 172. 
 351. Id. at 174.  As of 2002, African-American students comprised 13% of the enrollment 
at the University, and have held every major leadership post there.  David M. Halbfinger, 40 
Years After Infamy, Ole Miss Looks to Reflect and Heal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A1. 
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the marshals with gasoline bombs, bricks, and firearms; the marshals 
augmented by army troops fought back with tear gas, and there were 
numerous injuries and two deaths.  For the next year, three hundred 
national troops stayed on hand to keep order. 
These riots are reminiscent of the violence at the University of Vienna: 
the majority had an obsessive conviction that desegregation would “befoul” 
society, and implemented that conviction through brutality.  Yet the 
situations also differed in significant respects.  Austria’s universities had 
been integrated prior to the promulgation of the Nazi Student Orders, and 
continuation of the Orders would have precipitated a downward trajectory 
fueled by an external enemy.  Dis-integration was halted only by the 
judiciary, while the federal administration under Chancellor Buresch did 
not authorize police protection and unsuccessfully attempted to reestablish 
segregation through legislation.  The judiciary’s task was completed in one 
decision based on statute that encompassed an immediate remedy––
rescission of the German Student Body’s official separatist legitimation. 
In America, the upward trajectory based on a general constitutional 
command was contorted by the Brown II question of whether the remedy of 
prompt desegregation or a more gradual “deliberate speed” should be 
decreed.  Black and Douglas, the “libertarians,” favored a clear statement 
of unconstitutionality coupled with granting prompt relief to the named 
plaintiffs only.352
Operating in our common law framework that contemplates judge-made 
law to interpret the Constitution and may shade into “judicial activism,” the 
Justices produced a historic departure from precedent in Brown I, but then 
applied the brakes of judicial restraint with a heavy foot in Brown II.  
Ironically, the failure of the gradualist remedy to appease segregationists 
eventually necessitated a wider expansion of the federal judicial power than 
might have resulted from the quicker solution proposed by the civil 
libertarians.
  The gradualist solution was adopted, however, because 
its proponents feared that greater displays of federal judicial muscle would 
have provoked more widespread Southern resistance, and involved the 
courts in too much micro-managing. 
353
2. Challenges to Brown’s Predicates and Primacy 
 
Austrian legal academics generally maintained a silence about the 
validity of the Nazi Student Orders, with the exception of Dr. Joseph 
Hupka who had dissected them in the public press and found them to be 
 
 352. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 337, at 1930. 
 353. Id. 
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unlawful.354  After the High Court’s opinion was issued, constitutional law 
scholars merely summarized it or cited it largely in the context of 
discussing the formal requirements of Associations Law.355
Professor Herbert Wechsler’s “Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law” counseled that where the combination of constitutional 
phrases, history and precedent do not yield a clear answer in an 
adjudication, standards must be found that transcend the case at hand.
  By contrast, 
American law professors were not reticent about critiquing the legal 
underpinnings, assumptions, and consequences of the Brown decision. 
356  
From this unremarkable proposition, he went on to criticize the Supreme 
Court for failing to explain its later extension of the school desegregation 
decision to other facilities such as public transportation, which people are 
not obligated to use.357  Perhaps this was simply a way of stating that 
avoiding extensive analysis of a legal proposition for political reasons (the 
Justices did want to keep Brown short) is unacceptable.  Wechsler lost the 
high ground of reasonable generality, however, when he implied that the 
motive of the legislature should not be an object of inquiry and gave some 
credence to Plessy’s statement that racial separation is a badge of 
inferiority for Blacks “solely” because they “choose to put that construction 
upon it.”358  Professor Charles Black responded that the Court should be 
able to learn and use knowledge about the caste system’s purpose that is 
“obvious to everybody else and to the Justices as individuals,”359 and 
Professor (now Judge) Louis Pollak noted that Wechsler’s own criteria for 
“neutral” decision-making remained vague.360  Judge Richard Posner, in 
turn, commented that Wechsler’s unexplained reference to neutral 
principles may mean that judges should not premise their decisions on 
grounds that would “require them to engage with the messy world of 
empirical reality . . . .”361
Support for Brown’s equal protection holding, though not its 
sociological references, was developed by Professor Michael McConnell, 
who concluded after a comprehensive review of the legislative history that 
 
 
 354. See supra note 249. 
 355. See, e.g., Merkl, supra note 197. 
 356. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15, 19 (1959). 
 357. Id. at 22. 
 358. Id. at 33. 
 359. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421, 427 (1960). 
 360. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 PENN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). 
 361. Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 33 (1993). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment forbids assignment of students to separate 
schools or classes on the basis of race.362  Alexander Bickel’s take on that 
legislative history as inconclusive363 did not go far enough; originalist 
analysis demonstrates that Plessy was wrongly decided, not Brown.364
In a spirited exchange of views with McConnell, the primacy of Brown 
was challenged by Professor Michael Klarman.
 
365  He offered the 
provocative statement that Brown was “unnecessary from the perspective 
of long-term racial change” because traditional southern attitudes were 
already being altered by factors including Cold War imperatives, the 
increasing clout of northern Blacks, and the growing social integration of a 
nation linked by interstate travel and television.366  Yet Klarman proceeded 
to compliment Brown on its unintended consequences—fueling southern 
resistance in the form of officially-sanctioned violence against peaceful 
demonstrators, which captured the attention and civil rights sympathies of 
the North.367
A recent assessment by Professor James Patterson addressed in detail the 
entrenched phenomenon of de facto segregation and re-segregation, and the 
skepticism of critical race theorists about the goal of integration.
  The ugliness of these confrontations speeded the enactment 
of vital civil rights provisions. 
368  
Nonetheless, he concluded that Brown was of “incalculable” value because 
ideals of justice and equality were reconsecrated.369  As Richard Kluger 
observed in his monumental work Simple Justice: “The decision marked 
the turning point in America’s willingness to face the consequences of 
centuries of racial discrimination, a practice tracing back nearly to the First 
Settlement of the New World.”370
 
 362. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 949-55 (1995). 
  Then Jim Crow died in 1965, with the 
 363. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 56-60 (1955); cf. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism 
in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 938-40 (1986) 
(concluding after a persuasive analysis of legislative history that the framers of the 
fourteenth amendment conferred upon Congress and the federal courts the primary authority 
to enforce individual civil rights). 
 364. McConnell, supra note 362. 
 365. See generally Klarman, supra note 260. 
 366. Id. at 14. 
 367. Id. at 76. 
 368. See PATTERSON, supra note 335; see also Ogletree, supra note 335. 
 369. PATTERSON, supra note 335, at 222. 
 370. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at iii.  Thurgood Marshall, an NAACP advocate in the 
Brown consolidated cases, was appointed as the United States Supreme Court’s first Black 
justice in 1967.  Id. at 760.  For an analysis of Justice Marshall’s efforts to implement 
Brown, see Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall’s Desegregation 
Opinions, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 69 (1992). 
CHRISTENSENMARCUS 2/3/2011  9:57 PM 
2004] AUSTRIA’S PRE-WAR BROWN 161 
passage of the federal Voting Rights Act capping a year of comprehensive 
legislation championed by President Lyndon B. Johnson.371
This transformation of racial attitudes embodied in Brown was affected 
by post-war revulsion against Hitler’s policies of racial separation and 
brutality in Europe.
 
372  Racism was in bad odor, and associated with the 
enemy that America had defeated.  Southerners saw no analogy, however, 
and resented the efforts of Nazi propagandists to prop up their ideology by 
referring to Jim Crow laws.373
III. 
 
 
We study history, among other reasons, to learn from its successes as 
well as its mistakes.  The Austrian judiciary’s decision to rescind the Nazi 
Student Orders in 1931 responded to the same call for decency, equality, 
and full citizenship as Brown v. Board of Education did in 1954.  The same 
currents of minority rights within majority tides swirl through both 
opinions.  The consequences attendant on prohibitions against cultural 
diversity are evident,374
A. State Intervention vs. State Neutrality 
 and provide a lesson forward on the question of 
which doctrines should control when universities seek to avoid 
entanglement with associations that exclude Blacks. 
Associations law in 1930’s Austria was premised on assumptions that 
sharply differ from those of contemporary America.  Formation of citizen 
groups had been permitted as a matter of grace by Emperor Franz Joseph in 
1867.  This paternalistic largesse was accompanied by a high degree of 
police control, particularly of political groups that might become 
troublesome to the monarchy.  Although the right to form associations was 
subsequently established as fundamental and the registration procedures 
 
 371. See WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 188-90. 
 372. See Klarman, supra note 260, at 25-26. 
 373. See Johnpeter H. Grill & Robert L. Jenkins, The Nazis and the American South in 
the 1930’s: A Mirror Image?, 58 J. S. HIST. 667-68, 675-76, 684-88, 993 (1992); see also 
supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 374. See Council of the European Union Directive, Arts. 2, 3, and 5, prohibiting 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, and permitting member states to compensate 
for disadvantages linked to such origin.  Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. L 180.  
See Arie Farnam, Defying EU Pressure, Slovokia is Systematically Segregating Its Romany 
Minority Into Ghettos, and Barring Their Entrance Into Cities, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2003 at 4; supra Part I.H.1; cf. Mark Landler, Rare Bosnia Success Story, 
Thanks to U.S. Viceroy, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A3 (describing friendships between 
Muslims, Croats and Serbs in an integrated Bosnian high school). 
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applicable to associations were modified, the potential for full supervision 
remained in force.375
The emphasis was not on government neutrality, but rather on the 
organization’s adherence to the rules.  Thus, associations law could be used 
by the Constitutional Court to disband the “Nations” because they were 
unauthorized.
 
376  Political control over associations could also be used by 
the Dollfuss administration, however, to prevent the emergence of certain 
voluntary and peaceful groups while relentlessly “encouraging” citizens to 
join its own favored organization, the Fatherland Front.377
American associations law, by contrast, has adhered to the principle that 
government must remain content and viewpoint neutral when it interacts 
with private entities.
 
378
Has American law made appropriate calibrations in developing such 
restrictions?  Although the university setting is by tradition a center of 
intellectual and philosophical thought and experiment, racism has remained 
a stubborn reality.  One out of four minority college students are victims of 
hate crimes or bias-driven threats or slurs every year.
  This principle necessarily involves some loss of 
control over racist groups, and some tension with anti-discrimination law.  
Yet the Austrian experience demonstrates that permitting executive 
officials to retain broad powers over all associations is a problematic 
method of suppressing racism.  As some of the Austrian Justices well 
understood, implementation of constitutional restrictions on the authority of 
a public university to accommodate or dismantle associations was also 
needed in crafting a long-term solution. 
379  Universities with 
segregated student bodies continue to exist in America––Bob Jones has 
received more than fifteen minutes of fame.380
 
 375. See supra Part I.G.2.b. 
  And at the high school 
 376. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 377. See supra Part I G.2.b. 
 378. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (ruling that the University’s refusal to pay a third-party 
contractor for the printing costs of petitioners’ student publications containing religious 
articles was not supported by Establishment Clause concerns).  In his dissent, Justice Souter 
noted that “the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the 
Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate.  Other 
things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one message 
while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond.”  Id. at 
894; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (disallowing state university 
that routinely provided facilities for meetings of registered students from barring student 
religious speech).  The Supreme Court noted that where a state has chosen to offer a forum 
to citizens, exclusions “bear a heavy burden of justification.”  Id. at 268. 
 379. Issues in Diversity Prejudice and Ethnoviolence On Campus 6, HIGHER EDUC. 
EXTENSION SERVICE REV., No. 2 (Winter 1995) [hereinafter IssuesI]. 
 380. See infra notes 392, 402-08. 
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level, a Nazi organization has demanded the use of public school facilities 
for its activities, resulting in a split circuit court ruling approving the 
request.381
The following hypothetical will illustrate the tension between First and 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.  Assume that a public university in 
New York State generally provides large conference rooms for outside 
organizations which fill out a form describing their group and the activities 
planned for the desired space.  In my example, a request for such space has 
been made by a club from the local town called White World, which 
excludes all Blacks.  Some students on campus have protested against the 
granting of the request because of the group’s White supremacist website.  
The club’s attorney has therefore taken the precaution of attaching a letter 
to the request form, explaining that the University would be in violation of 
law if rooms for its conference series were denied.  The letter is passed on 
to the University’s counsel. 
 
The club’s lawyer describes White World as “an exclusively political 
association, with a clearly defined purpose: to reestablish White dominance 
in all public and private spheres, and to confine Blacks to the positions that 
reflect their innate inferiority.”  He notes that the First Amendment accords 
the freedom to associate with others for political ends and shields all-White 
organizations from governmental intrusion if their expressive purposes 
could not be promoted “nearly as effectively” without rejection of those 
who do not share the same racial characteristics.382
 
 381. See Nat’l Socialist White People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1012 (4th Cir. 
1973) (en banc).  The White supremacist group which initiated the suit was a successor to 
the American Nazi Party.  Id. 
  The connection 
between White World’s aims and its exclusion of Blacks is far more 
 382. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).  New York 
City amended its Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986), which had 
previously exempted clubs that were “distinctly private in nature,” establishing in this 
amendment that clubs with more than 400 members, regularly providing meals and 
receiving non-member payments for the furtherance of business shall not be deemed 
“distinctly private.”  Id. at 5-6.  In response to a suit by a consortium of 125 private clubs, 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision, finding no evidence that 
associational rights were significantly affected.  The Court noted, however, that it was 
“conceivable” that an association “organized for specific expressive purposes . . . will not be 
able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its 
membership to those who share the same sex . . .”  Id. at 13; see also concurring opinion of 
Justice O’Connor, suggesting protection for the associational rights of organizations “whose 
expressive purposes would be substantially undermined” unless they could exclude those of 
a different race.  Id. at 19; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (expanding 
on freedom of association).  The word “association” does not appear in the Constitution but 
is nevertheless rooted in rights to petition the government for redress of grievances, to speak 
freely, and to assemble.  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984), 
discussed infra notes 410-417 and in accompanying text. 
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evident than the link found sufficient in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale383
University counsel writes in response that although she agrees that the 
school cannot interfere with the club’s membership policies or restrict its 
speech rights, she is not convinced that the organization’s invidious private 
bias must be given affirmative constitutional protection.  If the University 
engages in the affirmative act of giving the organization the convenience 
and respectability of its facilities, which are designated for “desirable 
public purposes,” it might be going beyond what the Constitution requires 
and furthering the club’s agenda.
 
between the Scouts’ purposes and rejection of gays.  White World is at 
present a rather small group qualifying as an intimate association with no 
business component, rather than a large and unselective place of public 
accommodation that could be reached by anti-discrimination laws.  Its 
conferences, however, are open to all, and the club expects many young 
people to attend. 
384  Courts have found anti-discrimination 
policy at both national and state levels to be a compelling governmental 
interest that may in some contexts overcome competing First Amendment 
claims.  The University’s individualized admissions policy allowing a 
modest and flexible “plus factor” for Blacks in order to maintain racial 
diversity is also a compelling interest, one which would be incompatible 
with accommodating this organization’s conferences.385
B. Equal Treatment vs. Associational Freedom 
 
Brown placed the plaintiffs’ right to equality above the desire of Whites 
not to associate with them (a position that did not escape Herbert 
 
 383. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000), where the membership 
of an assistant scoutmaster with an “exemplary” record was revoked after he identified 
himself as gay in a newspaper interview.  Dale sued the Boy Scouts in the New Jersey 
courts, alleging a violation of the State’s public accommodations law prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Id. at 645.  The Supreme Court held that 
an association does not have to “associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain 
message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 655.  It 
was sufficient that the Boy Scouts believed that “homosexual conduct is inconsistent with 
the values it seeks to instill in its youth members . . . .”  Id. at 654.  For commentary on the 
majority opinion, see Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law 
After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001); Evelyn Brody, Entrance, 
Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 821, 848 (2002). 
 384. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 
893 n.12 (1985) (Souter, J., dissenting), where the Supreme Court concluded that when a 
university creates a limited public forum, speech distinctions based on subject matter are 
permissible if these distinctions are “’reasonable in light of the purposes served by the 
forum.’” (Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). 
 385. See infra Part III.C. 
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Wechsler’s doubting eye).  The Justices conceived of the Equal Protection 
Clause as, inter alia, a prohibition against the hierarchy that would confine 
African-Americans to being “a subject race.”386  Although “Black” and 
“White” identities in America have been constructed and expressed in a 
wide variety of social settings,387 the racial hierarchy enforced by legal 
measures such as the slave laws, Black Codes, and Jim Crow strictures 
have made these identities continue to appear more “natural” and 
“primordial.”388  Professor Rogers M. Smith has observed that this legally-
bolstered stratification not only injured Blacks but also Whites who “were 
tempted into investing deeply in racial lies and in oppressive arrangements 
that bred ongoing civil strife.”389
Overcoming such barriers to equality can be viewed as an element of 
liberty.  As Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested, 
 
libertarians, who may appear to oppose equality, insist on equality of an 
important kind; they want to ensure that all citizens have an equal right to 
pursue their own ends.  An understanding of equality lies at the heart of 
the libertarian creed.  Freedom from desperate conditions, often treated as 
an egalitarian idea, is an understanding of liberty as well.  Those who 
emphasize autonomy in the formation of preferences are speaking of both 
equality and liberty; they want to ensure that unjustified inequalities––
inequalities based upon . . . race, or sex, for example––do not limit the 
free development of individual personality.390
The University would invoke two Supreme Court decisions, Runyon v. 
McCrary
 
391 and Bob Jones University v. United States,392
 
 386. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2435-36 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, The 
Anticaste Principle]; Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 107, 150-56 (1976). 
 to support its 
 387. See e.g., K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, 
in COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30-38 (1996); J. M. Balkin, The 
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2360 (1997); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social 
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994). 
 388. Rogers M. Smith, “Black” and “White” in Brown: Equal Protection and the Legal 
Construction of Racial Identities, at 11 (2003), at http://bepress.com/ils/iss2/art16 (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 389. Id. at 13. 
 390. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, supra note 386, at 2411.  Sunstein explores the 
“alleged” opposition between equality and liberty, noting that the term “liberty” could refer 
to fundamental political rights such as free speech, but also to a system that would enhance 
autonomy in the development of personal beliefs by providing an adequate education to 
everyone and by countering unfair background conditions.  Id. at 2410, 2420. 
 391. 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see infra notes 393-97 and accompanying text. 
 392. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see also infra notes 402-09 and accompanying text. 
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argument that government has no constitutional duty to facilitate private 
bias.  Both involved segregated schools but neither has been broadly 
extended beyond its specific context.  McCrary was issued in response to 
strategies used by Southern states which had been forced to desegregate.393
The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ First Amendment claims, 
noting that while “private discrimination may be characterized as a form of 
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment . . . it 
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections,” quoting 
from its prior statement in Norwood v. Harrison.
  
Public schools were severely underfunded, while money was provided to 
benefit Whites-only private schools.  Black students who were denied 
admission to these all-White institutions sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(1991), a federal statute giving Blacks the same liberty to make and enforce 
contracts as Whites. 
394  Section 1981’s 
predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was passed pursuant to 
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate badges 
of slavery, and prohibited Whites from precluding contracts on racial 
grounds.395  Justice Stewart’s opinion for the McCrary majority indicated 
that the judiciary may not enforce discriminatory contractual schemes, and 
that the all-White schools must therefore extend contracts for educational 
services to the respondents.396  The Court also concluded with little 
analysis that mandating the admission of these Black children to the school 
need not interfere with the institution’s segregationist “ideas or dogma.”397
McCrary underscored the difference between government assistance to a 
biased private entity and government regulation of such an entity’s 
ideological expression, a point useful to the University in the White World 
example.  But, White World could counter that despite 1981’s grounding in 
Reconstruction era purposes, its text seeks parity of treatment between the 
  
(Recall Bob Jones University, which both admits Blacks and enforces 
segregation). 
 
 393. See Brody, supra note 383, at 842. 
 394. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (citing prior decision in Norwood v. 
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973)).  Norwood presented the question of whether a state 
statute providing free textbooks to students at private segregated schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The Court opined that although private bias is not barred by the 
Constitution, it cannot invoke the Constitution to get aid from the State. 
 395. Id. at 170 (citing the prior decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 342 U.S. 409, 
440 (1968)). 
 396. Id. at 172.  Because these schools solicited White students generally, with telephone 
directory yellow pages advertisements and mass mailings, they were deemed more public 
than private.  Id. at 173. 
 397. Id. at 176. 
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races.  If a Black applicant’s right to a school contract cannot be curtailed, 
then the club’s right to enter into a contract for space rental also cannot be 
denied solely because of the race of its members or its White supremacist 
advocacy.  The University’s provision of facilities for private uses has 
created a limited public forum in which viewpoint discrimination is 
presumed to be impermissible.398
Contrary to the 1930’s Austrian acceptance of official control over 
private organizations, America’s neutral limited-public-forum doctrine 
takes a skeptical and relativistic view of government authority to assess 
such private entities.  Under this doctrine, a state university has many of the 
characteristics of a traditional public forum (such as a city park or street), 
“at least as to its students.”
 
399  Each student group has its own constituency 
and beliefs, which should not be ranked by public officials.  And if a school 
has an express policy of providing conference space for outside 
organizations, viewpoint discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional 
when it precludes speech on a subject that would otherwise be within the 
forum’s self-designated purposes.400  White World could also note that 
under a divided Fourth Circuit ruling, a forum restriction based on a Nazi 
group’s biased membership policies would be as suspect under the First 
Amendment as a restriction based on the group’s speech.401
This body of public-forum law gives no weight to government policies 
prohibiting racial discrimination.  In Bob Jones University v. United 
States,
 
402 such policies were dispositive.  Bob Jones provides another 
instance of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to facilitate private bias, an 
instance arising in the tax context.  The majority held that a racially 
discriminatory private school could not receive tax exempt status as a 
charity under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.403  This school’s 
disciplinary rules provided that expulsion awaited anyone who dated or 
married “outside their own race” and anyone who encouraged such 
interracial bonds.404
 
 398. See supra note 378. 
  The Supreme Court noted that invidious distinctions 
 399. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5, 269 (1981) (State university’s refusal to 
grant student religious group access to university facilities generally available to other 
student groups, held unjustifiable content-based exclusion of religious speech). 
 400. Id. at 266.  But see supra note 384. 
 401. See Nat’l Socialist White People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th Cir. 
1973) (en banc). 
 402. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 403. Id. at 604.  The government interest in eradicating racial bias in education was 
compelling and substantially outweighed any burden that denial of tax benefits placed on 
petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs requiring segregation. 
 404. Id. at 580-81.  Prior to 1971, the University entirely excluded Blacks.  From 1971-
1975, it accepted applications from Blacks married “within their race.”  Id. at 580.  After the 
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based on “racial affiliation and association” are a form of racial 
discrimination.405
In order to qualify as a charity under the applicable tax provision, an 
organization must serve a desirable public purpose and confer a public 
benefit.
 
406  Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion concluded that 
educational institutions which purvey racial bias are not beneficial 
influences and should not be encouraged by the government.407  Citing 
Brown, McCrary, numerous federal statutes, and executive orders issued by 
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, Burger emphasized that the 
Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) was correct in recognizing that a 
private school is not charitable when it violates “established public 
policy.”408  Congress affirmatively manifested its approval of this I.R.S. 
ruling when it enacted a statute denying tax-exempt status to social clubs 
that practice discrimination on the basis of race or color409
Bob Jones could be viewed as no more than an interpretation of terms in 
a tax statute, or no less than a reaffirmation that all three branches of the 
federal government have rejected neutrality towards racial discrimination.  
Yet the issue of context is significant.  In the context of education, the 
government’s interest in eradicating institutional bias is so compelling that 
it requires little discussion of opposing claims.  The Constitution prohibits 
public schools from segregating, and federal statute prohibits segregated 
private schools from receiving tax exemptions that would essentially 
require the citizenry to subsidize racism. 
—a ruling that 
would apply to White World. 
Public policy relating to associations such as White World, however, 
juggles competing interests, each of which has been respectfully received 
by the Supreme Court and by federal and state legislatures.  Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees410
 
Supreme Court’s McCrary decision, supra notes 393-397, the school began to permit 
unmarried African-Americans to enroll, subject to the disciplinary rules that prohibited 
encouraging or engaging in interracial dating or marriage.  Id.  Bob Jones is a 
fundamentalist Christian non-profit corporation unaffiliated with any religious denomination 
and attended by 5000 students from kindergarten through graduate school.  Id. at 574, 580. 
 eloquently presented both of these interests.  
 405. Id. at 605. 
 406. Id. at 591-92. 
 407. Id. at 595. 
 408. Id. at 586, 594, 598.  For an illuminating article on tax expenditure concepts, see 
Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 
447-49 (1999). 
 409. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601. 
 410. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  For an analysis of conflicts between the mediating function of 
associations and other interests, see Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 
Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949 (2004). 
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Local chapters of the Junior Chamber of Commerce (“Jaycees”) filed 
charges against their national organization, alleging that the national 
office’s bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act by excluding 
women from regular membership.411  As stated in the bylaws, the Jaycees’ 
objectives were to assist young men to participate in civic organizations 
and community affairs.412
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion recognized that associations may 
provide emotional enrichment to individuals; enhance cultural diversity; 
and strengthen protection for political dissenters.
 
413  Nevertheless, the 
constitutional protection that is warranted for such associations may not 
extend to larger business enterprises that qualify as places of public 
accommodation.414  The Court emphasized that a statute prohibiting 
discrimination by such enterprises addresses  serious personal and societal 
injuries: “deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of 
equal access to public establishments,” a deprivation visited on historically 
disadvantaged groups which have been arbitrarily barred from 
opportunities for economic advancement.415  The Roberts majority 
concluded that the Jaycees organization had neither shown that it was an 
intimate association, nor demonstrated that its rights of expression would 
have been so impaired by admission of women that the state’s interest in 
equality would have to yield.416  It was instead a large and unselective 
business group subject to the Minnesota Human Rights Act’s anti-
discrimination strictures.417
If Roberts is considered a navigational chart, White World has avoided 
these shoals.  It is small, selectively confined to applicants with a particular 
ideology, and does no business.  Ironically, its wholly racist aims could 
provide further insulation from the reach of civil rights statutes because 
compelled admission of Blacks would undermine its expressive message.  
The University’s refusal to follow limited-public-forum neutrality with 
respect to White World’s request cannot be premised on claims that the 
club’s exclusivity conflicts with federal
 
418 or New York State419
 
 411. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614. 
 public 
accommodations laws. 
 412. Id. at 612-13. 
 413. Id. at 618-19. 
 414. Id. at 620, 624. 
 415. Id. at 625. 
 416. Id. at 626-27. 
 417. Id. at 621, 628. 
 418. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, e (2003). 
 419. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.2(a) (McKinney 2004). 
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C.   University Autonomy and Diversity 
Two conflicting (or at least divergent) bodies of public policy emanate 
from Supreme Court consideration of equality versus association in cases 
such as McCrary, Bob Jones, and Roberts and its successors.  But shifting 
to a context specific to the White World controversy, a third policy 
emerges from the Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.420  The 
majority expressed high estimation of university autonomy as grounded in 
the First Amendment,421
Grutter gave universities broad discretion to further a compelling 
interest in the educational benefits of maintaining student diversity––a mix 
of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and 
learn from each other.
 unlike the Austrian Court’s subordination of that 
autonomy to a statutory regimen. 
422  Just as geographical differences or particular 
professional experiences can add to the mix, so too can the “unique 
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which 
race unfortunately still matters.”423  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion 
noted that not every race-influenced decision is equally problematic.  Strict 
scrutiny, which is not always “fatal in fact” when applied, provides a 
framework for distinguishing between valid and invalid considerations of 
race in the particular context at issue.424  The Court rejected a challenge to 
Michigan Law School’s diversity policy brought by a White applicant who 
alleged that she had been denied admission in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the Law School gave favored treatment to minority 
students with credentials similar to those of Whites who were not 
accepted.425
To insure discourse benefits, the school’s admissions policy utilized race 
as a flexible and modest “plus” factor in order to include a “critical mass” 
of minority students.
 
426  Stressing the importance of this goal, Grutter 
approvingly quoted Justice Powell’s opinion in the landmark Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke427
 
 420. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 case: “10 or 20 black students could 
 421. Id. at 332; see generally Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, SOC. SCI. RES. 
NETWORK ELECTRONIC LIBR., available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=568501. 
 422. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. 
 423. Id. at 335. 
 424. Id. at 331. 
 425. Id. at 324-25. 
 426. Id. at 323-27, 337. 
 427. 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) discussed in the Grutter majority 
opinion at 336.  For an analysis of the evolution of Powell’s position to received wisdom, 
see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, -- SUP. CT. REV. -- (SOC. SCI. RES. ELECTRONIC 
CHRISTENSENMARCUS 2/3/2011  9:57 PM 
2004] AUSTRIA’S PRE-WAR BROWN 171 
not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points 
of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States.”428  
“Critical mass” indicated numbers that would encourage students to engage 
in discussions inside and outside the classroom, without feeling isolated or 
pressured to act as representatives of their race.429
Several prestigious constituencies filed amicus briefs bolstering (and 
influencing) the majority’s compelling-state-interest conclusions.  
Educational experts, major businesses, and military leaders urged that 
student body diversity is essential to the development of professionalism, 
international business skills, and an officer corps equipped to preserve the 
fabric of society.
 
430
At the University of Vienna in the 1930’s, there was little dialogue 
between Gentile and Jewish students.  Adherents of the German Student 
Body––the vast majority of the whole––were deeply invested in the 
hierarchy of ethnic origin, and the University endorsed their 
assumptions.
  Cross-racial understanding––reducing misinformation 
about the Other––produces an informed citizenry and prepares all students 
for participation in a multi-cultural country and a global marketplace. 
431  The limited opportunity for students from varying 
backgrounds to exchange ideas arose within one or two political clubs that 
mirrored the national political parties.432  Members of the German Student 
Body graduated to become government and business officials who regarded 
their Aryan heritage as a badge of entitlement.433
American universities today are complex institutions that pursue a 
variety of goals.
  This, in turn, affected 
Austria’s political institutions; democracy requires leaders who have an 
accurate basis for assessing different viewpoints. 
434
 
NETWORK ELECTRONIC LIBR., Working Paper No. 03-12), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=476061. 
  One of these may be facilitating the upward mobility of 
those who are blocked by the interrelated factors of discrimination and a 
starting-point in poverty.  These factors also hinder members of groups 
 428. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323. 
 429. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325-26. 
 430. Id. at 332-33. 
 431. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 432. See, e.g., PAULEY, supra note 2, at 122, 124. 
 433. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 434. Some of these are described by Christopher Kutz in Groups, Equality, and the 
Promise of Democratic Politics, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE 
OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, at 12-13 (2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art13 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2004).  Professor Kutz concludes that selective Universities are not 
mere prizes for high test-takers, and that their purposes may include “transforming a racial 
status hierarchy that arose under a white supremacy system” and “preparing a cadre of 
professionals who are likely to serve underserved communities.”  Id. 
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who are subject to widespread vilification from effective participation in 
the political process.435  Professor Daniel Sabbagh suggests that university 
training which raises the historically-shaped position of African-Americans 
in the economic hierarchy can reduce “the correlation between race and 
occupational status.”436
In the White World example, the club’s primary purpose is to preserve 
such stereotypes and prevent Blacks from escaping an ascribed status.  But, 
the University’s denial of the club’s request for conference space could 
have no effect on the members’ self-identification and exclusivity as 
established in their by-laws.  Nor is the University’s decision aimed at 
suppressing speech.  White World can convene elsewhere and has a web 
site (with many links to other organizations) through which it also 
expresses its ideology.  Rather, the University’s concern is with the harmful 
effects on diversity which the club’s presence on campus could generate. 
  This, in turn, would reduce the “functionality”––
the predictive value––of stereotypes. 
White World’s open conferences would bring to the campus a large 
number of young people who are interested in taking action to confine 
African-Americans to positions that accord with their “innate inferiority.”  
Walking across campus grounds to reach the building where the conference 
rooms are located, encounters with Black students would occur.  Members 
of White supremacist organizations have engaged in violence designed to 
terrorize African-Americans at college campuses.437
 
 435. Id. at 12; see also the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) questioning (as to the impact of legislation) “whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.” 
  Although White 
World acknowledges that its adherents have on some occasions engaged in 
 436. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action and the Group-Disadvantaging Principle, in 
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, at 
5 (2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art14 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004); see also Cass 
Sustein, Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2416 (1994) (discussing the 
persistence of racial inequality even in free markets, and noting that attending a prestigious 
college increases employment opportunities). 
 437. See Sylvia Castro, Suspect Arrested in Attack at SSUF; Clovis Man, 20, Faces 
Attempted Murder and Hate Crime Charges, FRESNO BEE (California), Sept. 3, 1997, at A1; 
Michael Kikorian & Kimi Yoshino, Man Arrested in Clovis Hate Crime; Brian Ritter Was 
Linked to Similar Crime at Fresno State, FRESNO BEE (California), Dec. 23, 1998, at B1; see 
also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, Hate Crimes On Campus: The Problem and Efforts to Confront It, Hate 
Crimes Series no. 3, at 4, available at http://wwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/187249.pdf 
(describing the detonation of a pipe bomb in the dorm room of two African-American 
students on a Utah Campus, with the letters KKK painted in red nail polish on the bomb’s 
firing device). 
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fist-fights with Blacks as reported in the press, the club argues that its own 
rhetoric skirts the Brandenburg v. Ohio prohibition against incitement to 
immediate action.438
Fighting words can have political aspects, but the Supreme Court has 
barred such words from the speech marketplace because they “are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth.”
  The University is nonetheless hesitant to bear the risk 
that illegal conduct including “fighting words” and assaults would 
accompany the influx of outside attendees attracted to the conferences, 
because such acts have a long-term impact. 
439  Nor is an ideologically motivated assault “by any 
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.”440  As Professor Laurence L. Tribe notes, “expression has 
special value only in the context of ‘dialogue’” between differing views, 
not in the context of insults that do not present ideas but instead inflict 
injury “by their very utterance.”441
Systematic studies of ethnoviolence on college campuses were 
conducted in the 1986-1995 period by the National Institute against 
Prejudice and Violence and other researchers.
 
442  Ethnoviolence has been 
defined as acts “intended to cause physical or psychological harm to 
persons because of their actual or perceived membership in a group.”443  It 
ranges from assaults, arson, and intimidation to vandalism and harassment.  
Almost 25% of minority students had been victims of such conduct.444
Students sampled at a Maryland college and at nine colleges and 
universities in New York State were asked about the effect of 
ethnoviolence on them.  Thirty percent felt afraid of more trouble; 29% 
tried to be less visible and not to be noticed; 26% became withdrawn; 42% 
obsessed about the incident; 54% were angry; 19% lost people they thought 
were friends.
 
445
 
 438. See 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding “[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do 
not permit a State to . . . proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action”).  Id. at 447. For a discussion of Brandenburg’s 
sparse reasoning and implications, see Maria L. Marcus, Policing Speech on the Airwaves: 
Granting Rights, Preventing Wrongs, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 461-467 (1997). 
  Others who were aware that a person sharing their ethnic 
 439. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 440. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984). 
 441. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (1998). 
 442. See Issues, supra note 379, at 3, 11. 
 443. Id. at 2-3. 
 444. Id. at 6. 
 445. Id. at 11.  A detailed executive summary of the underlying data states that compared 
to other student groups that experience trauma, “there was a definite tendency for Black 
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identity had been victims were also affected, even though they had not 
personally been targets.446  Access to the full university experience and the 
equal opportunity to learn are truncated.  If African-American students 
withdraw from interactions with Whites inside and outside the classroom, 
the benefits of diversity that were approved in Grutter would be dissipated.  
A critical mass of numbers alone cannot be the objective.  (Note the 
scornful reference in Justice Thomas’ Grutter dissent to a mere “aesthetic” 
interest in the color of students in the classrooms.)447
To counteract these effects, would it be sufficient for the University 
Dean in our example to join a grass-roots student protest against White 
supremacy rather than keeping White World’s conferences out?
  The educational 
value of diversity flows from discussion of insights and experiences. 
448  A 
University is a community embracing “expansive freedoms of speech and 
thought,” and encouraging the “robust exchange of ideas.”449  Yet the 
exchange of ideas on an ongoing day-to-day basis is precisely what is being 
suppressed by ethnoviolence.  The occurrence of vituperation and threats 
based solely on the highly visible (but morally irrelevant) element of 
race450
The power of the neutrality principle, which would dictate that the 
University cannot predicate its decisions on such consequences, must now 
be reexamined.  Considered in the abstract, an open speech marketplace 
without content-based regulation of groups is desirable because it could 
invigorate a search for permanent values and enhance democratic 
governance.  The Supreme Court, however, has recently taken a more 
empirical tack.  As indicated in Virginia v. Black’s
 silences its targets and erodes their sense of security, even if other 
groups of students or administrative officials are supportive. 
451
 
students to experience more symptoms.”  See Intergroup Relations On Campus––CUMBC: 
The Second Study, Chapter Four, Traumatic Effects of Ethnoviolence and Sexual 
Harrassment, at 7. 
 analysis of a statute 
prohibiting cross-burning with the intent to intimidate, the government is 
not limited to laws of general applicability when it provides legislative 
 446. See Issues, supra note 379, at 7. 
 447. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 448. In view of the public policy at federal and state levels that condemns racial 
discrimination, public officals may speak in vigorous opposition to racist ideology.  Accord 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, 229, 231-32, discussed 
in Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667, 
1684 and passim (2001).  Professor Greene analyzes the conditions under which 
government participation even in contested debates might be permissible.  Id.; see also 
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 10 and passim (2000). 
 449. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324, 329. 
 450. See Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, supra note 386, at 2429. 
 451. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
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protection for historically disadvantaged groups such as African-
Americans.  Although Virginia had promulgated another more facially-
neutral law (burning an object with intent to intimidate) which would also 
have covered a crossburning,452 the Black majority interpreted the First 
Amendment as permitting the state to single out the fiery cross as “a 
particularly virulent form of intimidation.”453  Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
identified this symbol as a Ku Klux Klan method used to communicate 
threats that assisted in maintaining White supremacy.454
Black’s emphasis on history (“Virginia may choose to regulate this 
subset of intimidating messages in light of cross-burning’s long and 
pernicious history as a signal of impending violence”)
 
455 also has 
implications for equal protection interpretation.  Professor Sunstein 
suggests that the Equal Protection Clause was “originally conceived as an 
effort to counteract the disproportionate subjection of black people to 
public and private violence.”456
Before Grutter, University counsel addressing this question had a 
cramped range of arguments.  Caselaw in other contexts proclaims that 
anti-discrimination “policy” is established, while civil rights statutes 
provide exceptions that would protect racist clubs.  The school’s 
characterization of its forum as designed for “desirable public purposes”––
the Bob Jones formulation
  The University’s refusal to accommodate 
White World’s conferences is not an effort to shield the government from 
criticism; rather it is an effort to shield its Black students from 
disproportionate exposure to intimidation and attack.  Can the school 
invoke both a Fourteenth and First Amendment basis for doing so? 
457
Grutter grounded university autonomy on the First Amendment, and 
deferred to the school’s expert judgment (substantiated by the amici), that 
diversity was essential to its academic goals.  This compelling interest in 
the educational benefits of maintaining a “critical mass” of minority 
students could tilt the balance against White World’s associational claims.  
The conference-space forum limitation to desirable purposes meshes well 
––appeared to beg the question of whether 
barring biased activities was more desirable than fostering private 
associations. 
 
 452. Id. at 352 n.1. 
 453. Id. at 363. 
 454. Id. at 354 (quoting with approval W. WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE KU KLUX KLAN 
IN AMERICA 147-48 (1998)). 
 455. Id. at 363. 
 456. See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 821 (1993). 
 457. See supra notes 402, 407 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court concluded 
that purveying racial bias neither served a desirable public purpose nor conferred a public 
benefit. 
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with precluding organizations that would undermine the University’s 
diversity mission. 
To arrive at a resolution of such a controversy under American law 
requires intricate analysis of competing bodies of policy and of Supreme 
Court decisions arising in a variety of settings.  Austrian law in the 1930s 
utilized a far more efficient system, in which all associations were 
circumscribed by statute and subject to official supervision.  Racist groups 
fostered by a university could be shut down, although they could 
potentially be reactivated by political changes in the legislative or 
executive branches.  America’s more cumbersome approach rejects this 
hands-on control.  Yet by forcing competing associational and equality 
rights into an evolving constitutional framework, we give ourselves a better 
chance of enduring. 
CONCLUSION 
The institution of slavery, which has decisively influenced America’s 
history and its Constitution, embraced myths about race which still linger 
despite judicial and legislative initiatives.  Before Brown, unequal 
treatment was rationalized and bureaucratized.  Brown articulated the 
baseline principles that eventually destroyed Jim Crow but new racially-
fueled challenges continue to emerge, most recently in the arena of higher 
education.  This Article suggests that an understanding of these challenges 
may be gained by viewing them both from an American and from a global 
perspective. 
Universities have guarded their autonomy and discretion to decide who 
to admit, what to teach, and how to teach it.  Such autonomy engenders a 
responsibility to the student body as a whole and creates a safe space for a 
spirit of inquiry, but poses a risk that racism might find shelter in the 
institution’s independence from judicial intervention.  Two cases discussed 
in this Article suggest that risk, and show how it may be obviated.  Each 
university invoked separate-but-equal treatment and associational freedom 
to achieve a pre-set segregation goal, but each was eventually thwarted by 
the judiciary’s associations analysis. 
The University of Vienna argued that segregation of its Jewish and 
Christian students into different “Nations” was merely an internal matter, 
and that members of each group benefited from affiliating with those of the 
same “ethnic origin.”  The University’s autonomy, however, provided no 
shield against the Associations Law, which allowed a high degree of 
government control over citizen groups.  This regulatory power enabled the 
Austrian Constitutional Court to halt the student divisions, but was also 
available for use by the executive branch to further its own political 
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agenda. 
The University of Oklahoma asserted that its admission of G.W. 
McLaurin, an African-American student who was allowed to attend classes 
and study in a separate assigned place and eat at an assigned table alone, 
was sufficient to fulfill all its educational responsibilities and its obligations 
under state law.  The Supreme Court introduced a pivotal associations 
concept into its equal treatment discussion: that McLaurin’s education 
would be undermined by his government-mandated inability to have 
discussions and to commingle intellectually with his classmates.  This 
approach transformed the associations doctrine, emphasizing inclusion 
rather than exclusion. 
In America and in Austria, the judiciary was uncomfortable with the role 
of dismantling segregation.  Both courts were confronted with implacable 
opposition to the idea of integration, and devoted considerable thought to 
crafting a decision that would somehow soothe the sensibilities and 
tempers of these opponents.  Ultimately, the Justices in each case were 
constrained to accept the initial consequences of their choice: student riots 
and further public attempts to resegregate. 
The Brown decision is now celebrating its fiftieth anniversary.  It has 
opened college, university, and graduate school doors to African-
Americans in far greater numbers than before, discounting the argument 
that Whites were permitted to wall themselves off by law from contact with 
Blacks.  Under Brown’s unanimous directive, the Fourteenth Amendment 
secured equality by incorporating the McLaurin associational rights of 
African-American students.  Most recently, Grutter v. Bollinger accorded 
broad discretion to Michigan Law School to further a compelling interest in 
the educational benefits of increasing student diversity and cross-racial 
understanding.  Here it was the University’s First Amendment associational 
right to assemble this varied student body that took precedence over a 
White applicant’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
While the American politics of race has its own unique features, the 
practice of segregating groups of people and forcing them into hierarchies 
dictated by the social conditions and ruling ideology of the day has 
tenacious roots throughout the world.  The rule of law as expressed in a 
constitution may clash sharply with the court of public opinion and political 
power.  The rationalization of hereditary and fixed ranking based on tainted 
blood was enforced by streams of legislation that led to the Holocaust in 
Austria and to prolonged subservience to majority rule-makers in the 
American South.  The Supreme Court’s succinct (albeit imperfect) “hard 
look” at Plessy penetrated supposedly neutral mandates and made 
segregation here an outlaw both legally and morally.  Brown was decided 
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less than ten years post-Holocaust––not a coincidence. 
 
